

Report of the joint evaluation of the Indonesian ECB consortium's responses to the West Java and West Sumatra earthquakes

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Executive Summary

1. Introduction

The Indonesian Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) consortium has eight member agencies. They are CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, International Medical Corps (IMC), Masyarakat Penanggulangan Bencana Indonesia (MPBI) or the Indonesian Society of Disaster Management, Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, Save the Children, and World Vision Indonesia. In December 2009 the members decided to conduct a joint evaluation of the response by its various members to the 2nd September West Java earthquake and the 30th September West Sumatra earthquakes.

The joint evaluation was carried out from February 16th to March 7th 2010. It was an independent evaluation and its objectives were to:

- 1) Review the ECB Indonesia consortium's emergency responses to the West Java and West Sumatra earthquakes, measured in terms of the ECB goal to improve the speed, quality and effectiveness of the humanitarian community to save lives, protect the livelihoods, and defend the rights of people in emergency situations. This review will include both the *process* of collaboration and the *results* of the actual program in West Sumatra.
- 2) Review the levels and degree of coordination of the consortium members as a group with the National, Provincial and District governments and the BNPB, and other key stakeholders including other INGOs, national NGOs, UN agencies and donors.
- 3) Define recommendations for improving the collaboration in emergency response in the future. The recommendations will inform future protocols and guidelines of collaboration and joint response for both the Indonesia consortium and the other ECB country level consortia.

2. The context

Earthquakes and other natural disasters are a constant occurrence in Indonesia, creating destruction and human suffering. This was the case for the West Java and West Sumatra earthquakes which created widespread destruction of the housing sector and loss of life in both provinces. Recovery efforts in both provinces are still underway. It will take time and effort of many different agencies to ensure that the quality of life for the affected people in these provinces returns to its pre-earthquake levels. Given the disaster prone conditions in Indonesia, collaborative efforts by responding agencies can only help to ensure that more disaster affected people are assisted quickly, appropriately and effectively.

3. The Indonesian Emergency Capacity Building Consortium

At the time of the West Java Earthquake on September 2nd, the Indonesian ECB consortium had existed for nearly five years.¹ Its purpose is to improve the capacity of members to prepare for and respond to emergencies; particularly in terms of response speed, quality and effectiveness. A consortium structure was in place with each member agency having a designated project management team member (PMT) to represent the interests of their agency in the consortium. A lead agency was selected through

¹ The Indonesian ECB consortium was set up in 2005. Phase I of ECB in Indonesia ended in March 2007 bringing to a close the formal ECB collaboration in Indonesia. The formal collaboration restarted in 2008 under ECB phase II.

consensus. This was CRS. A field facilitator was hired to coordinate the work of the consortium. A consortium engagement plan was defined for 2009-13 detailing the capacities that would be built.

Over time trust, collaboration and positive communication processes developed between PMT members who were often their agencies emergency response managers. This group often collaborated on needs assessment following an emergency. Such collaboration on needs assessment became a norm from mid-2007 onwards. This often consisted of each ECB member using a common form to collect needs assessment data within a specific geographic area. Needs assessment findings were shared in meetings on the phone, or by emails. In addition, bilateral actions to improve the effectiveness of emergency response programs were taking place. Bilateral arrangements were often between PMT members working in the field. Collaboration was voluntary and not always formalized in writing.

4. The process of collaboration following the 2009 West Java earthquake

CRS, Mercy Corps, Oxfam, STC and WVI responded during the first month following the earthquake. By the end of September CRS, STC and WVI had completed immediate relief activities and left. Mercy Corps and Oxfam have continued to work there. In September, 2009 collaboration on joint needs assessment took place. This included discussions to agree use of the needs assessment tool and meetings, email and phone calls to discuss the needs assessment findings. Bilateral actions took place between agencies on tarpaulin distribution for emergency shelter purposes and on WASH activities. Otherwise agencies worked in separate geographic areas that were distant to one another. The response in West Java by all agencies including the government has not provided a strong basis of recovery for people in West Java. OCHA has called it a 'forgotten disaster'.

5. The process of collaboration following the West Sumatra earthquake

Seven of the Indonesian ECB agencies responded to the West Sumatra earthquake. In contrast to the West Java response there was greater collaboration on the joint needs assessment. Specifically, Mercy Corps publicly took the lead on the West Sumatra response. They coordinated discussions both with ECB and other agencies on locations for collecting assessment data and they compiled all data sent to them from various agencies. The compiled data was submitted to OCHA on the 5th October so that OCHA could complete an overall West Sumatra needs assessment report.

As the West Sumatra lead agency Mercy Corps pursued emergency response funds on behalf of ECB agencies. This brought in a number of ECB agency directors that had previously delegated ECB matters to their PMT member. PMT members and the ECB field facilitator were bypassed during the October discussions on fund allocations. This was particularly so for an OFDA grant to the ECB consortium for use by five agencies: CARE, CRS, Mercy Corps, STC and WVI. Both the needs assessment work and joint funding proposals required more meetings to be held between consortium members. Agreements had to be reached on clear geographic boundaries where each agency would carry out its work when using consortium funds. Duplication of efforts needed to be avoided. Beyond these actions, each ECB agency worked independently to implement their West Sumatra emergency response programs.

6. Main Conclusions

These conclusions largely focus on the five agencies that participated in the OFDA grant. All five of them carried out their immediate relief programs in West Sumatra from October through December 2009 except for one which completed it by mid-November. The agencies then transitioned into early recovery programs which for two will continue until the end of March and for the other three will continue respectively until April, July and September 2010.

Coverage: The coverage achieved in West Sumatra was significant. These five ECB agencies together with Oxfam provided some form of relief support to an estimated 37% of the people affected by the earthquake. This was a sizeable contribution and it was possible because these agencies had funds from multiple sources. The funds that the five member agencies received from the OFDA grant to the consortium represented only 10% of total funds for one agency and an estimated 20-30% for others. All agencies targeted their support to communities that were the most severely affected by the earthquake.

Appropriateness: The five ECB agencies involved in the OFDA grant distributed NFIs quickly that met immediate needs. NFI items were distributed equally across villages to households with damaged houses. However, each agency distributed different types of kits, with different items and used different names for their NFI kits. The rationale for these differences is not clear. There was no evident consistency in what ECB agencies did in West Sumatra in terms of NFI distribution.

CARE, CRS, Mercy Corps and STC are implementing much needed transitional shelter (T-shelter) programs. The size and the speed at which these programs are being implemented by each agency are considerably different. Greater collaboration on T-shelter is gradually emerging with four ECB agencies doing a T-shelter learning study and one agency now being invited by others to provide them T-shelter technical support.

Beneficiary accountability: The five ECB agencies involved in the OFDA consortium grant informed community leaders when they began to work in a village. Three agencies worked closely with leaders during distribution and two worked more directly with local people. Due to the differences in relationships at community level some agencies are well known and others are not known at all. In addition some of the agencies provide clear information to beneficiaries and involve them in decisions and others are not doing this well. Of most concern is the lack of clarity on beneficiary selection criteria in three of the villages visited where T-shelter support is provided. This lack of clarity on beneficiary selection criteria for T-shelter programs is creating *'social tension and envy'*.

Effectiveness in terms of response speed due to consortium actions: By working together agencies were able to map the areas affected by the earthquake more quickly. Each agency began distribution of relief items within a week of the earthquake. This response time for each of the agencies in regards to logistics, e.g. procurement, delivery of NFIs, was considered to be the same as in other emergency responses. The OFDA funding did not influence the speed of response as each agency received funds from their respective headquarter offices. They did not wait for OFDA funds to arrive. Using their own resources, they began procurement and delivery of goods to targeted villages/households. As a result,

beneficiaries received the various NFI packages quickly. However, two agencies were delayed in implementing their T-shelter programs.

Effectiveness of the needs assessment process: The joint needs assessment (JNA) process brought gains including in optimizing the use of staff resources as only one ECB agency had to assign staff to tabulate the data from three ECB agencies and from other organizations. The JNA process enabled data to be collected across a wider geographic area and for data on various sectors to be obtained in a short period of time. It started discussions on geographic targeting and there was less geographic overlap during the data collection process. However, the JNA tool was ‘not efficient’² providing too much information for rapid assessment purposes and too little for in-depth assessment purposes. In addition, the JNA results were not used by all agencies. Some agencies conducted both more rapid and in-depth assessments. Other agencies had adequate data from the JNA to begin planning their emergency response programs.

The meetings held to agree on the JNA process and geographic targeting under the OFDA grant did result in agencies sharing much information about their programs. The information assisted ECB agencies to target assistance more effectively. There was restraint on the part of agencies in overlapping of NFI distributions in the same geographic areas in relationship to the geographic areas specified in the OFDA grant. This suggests that a common grant led to improvements in coordinating distributions. However, there was more overlapping of NFI distribution outside of the OFDA grant areas. This overlapping drew formal complaints but it continued nonetheless indicating that coordination improvements are needed. Also there was no evidence that agencies have agreed to use any common standards when carrying out similar types of programs.

Impacts: At the village level the separate emergency response programs of the five ECB agencies has resulted in reduced suffering for disaster affected people and their basic needs being met. T-shelter programs are underway and in some villages people have a safe place to live though there remains much to be done in order for the housing sector to recover across West Sumatra . As in Aceh the support to housing, where it is not sensitively done, is creating social tension.

Effectiveness of coordination with other agencies: Only two NGOs that collaborated with the ECB consortium and or its individual members were interviewed during the evaluation. One was a local NGO and the other an International NGO. Both of these NGOs said that collaboration with the ECB agencies had improved the speed, quality and effectiveness of their responses in West Sumatra. OFDA also commended the efforts of the ECB agencies for their fast response and wide geographic coverage in West Sumatra. However, the ECB and its individual members appear to be less well known among district government officials and by shelter cluster staff. If consortium members plan to advocate together during future emergency responses they may need to ensure that the consortium is better known and that members more consistently apply standards across their various programs.

Effectiveness of coordination among ECB member agencies: The existence of the consortium with established relationships between members enabled agencies to go beyond the bounds of the consortium’s current capacity building design. *Jointly*, the consortium response had a wider geographic

² OCHA’s description of using the JNA tool in their October 7th 2009, West Sumatra draft assessment report, p.11.

coverage because the agencies made the conscious decision to coordinate. Working together, agencies minimized the overlapping of relief efforts. They were able to identify gaps in targeting. The joint funding arrangement resulted in funds being less concentrated in the hands of only a few agencies.

The fact that collaboration was endorsed from the headquarter levels of each ECB agency and that it was already beginning to happen bilaterally between agencies in Indonesia during emergency responses resulted in one ECB member agency trying to do more during the West Sumatra response. Specifically it proposed a funding arrangement on behalf of ECB rather than just for itself. While fund and NFI resource allocation discussions strained relationships they also required staff to meet. Geographic areas for implementing activities funded under the common proposals had to be agreed. While relationships were tense and trust waned at times, agencies did gain more knowledge of each other than just at the personal level. Much was learnt about ways to more deliberately collaborate during an actual emergency response and though not measureable there were some gains from collaboration in terms of the speed, quality and effectiveness of the response by ECB agencies in West Sumatra.

7. Recommendations by ECB Indonesia member agencies

The recommendations below are those prioritized by the seven ECB member agencies that attended the evaluation workshop on the 2nd of March. They are described in more detail in section 10 of the report. These recommendations are endorsed by the lead evaluator who has added one additional recommendation at the end.

When reviewing the recommendations it should be noted that six of the directors of the Indonesian ECB consortium agencies had in their independent interviews said that joint response activities during an emergency should be pursued in future as long as *'they raise the quality of the response so that disaster affected people benefit'*. They did not specify what these activities should be only that a business plan or preparedness plan needs to be developed to define potential activities. The recommendations to be implemented by the Indonesian ECB consortium are to:

Develop standard operating procedures for joint response

Develop an advocacy plan

Improve the joint need assessment process

Improve beneficiary accountability

Define the Indonesian ECB consortium's vision

A recommendation for the headquarters and regional offices of each ECB member agency is to:

Decide the level of collaboration they expect their country emergency response teams to have with other ECB member agencies and communicate their position widely across their agency.

Abbreviations

BNPD	National Disaster Management Agency (Indonesia)
CEP	Consortium Engagement Plan
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECB	Emergency Capacity Building
FF	Field Facilitator
GOI	Government of Indonesia
HH	Household
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IMC	International Medical Corps
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
JE	Joint Evaluation
JNA	Joint Needs Assessment
MPBI	Masyarakat Penanggulangan Bencana Indonesia (Indonesian Society of Disaster Management)
NFI	Non-Food Items
PMT	Project Management Team
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
RS	Richter Scale
STC	Save the Children
T-shelter	Transitional Shelter
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WHO	World Health Organization
WVI	World Vision Indonesia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Contents

Acknowledgements	2
Executive Summary	3
Abbreviations.....	8
1. Introduction.....	11
2. The joint evaluation team and process.....	11
3. The structure of the report.....	13
4. A brief history of ECB in Indonesia.....	14
5. The West Java earthquake and the response by ECB member agencies.....	16
6. The West Sumatra earthquake.....	17
6.1 The context	17
6.2 The response by ECB member agencies	18
6.3 Coverage	19
6.4 Programs under consortia grants	20
The appropriateness of the activities carried out.....	21
The quality of the response or how agencies involved and informed beneficiaries about their programs	21
Effectiveness in terms of needs assessment and response speed and the use of standards.....	23
The immediate intended and unintended impacts of the programs.....	24
Improvements and recommendations from village level	25
6.5 The similarities and differences between ECB agency programs	26
7. External views of the Indonesian ECB consortium.....	26
7.1 A summary of external views	28
8. The effectiveness of ECB's internal coordination.....	28
8.1 The successes and benefits of greater collaboration	29
8.2 The challenges of collaborating more during a response	29
Funding and resource use.....	29
New emergency staff and communications	30
Rules of engagement	30
8.3 Major learnings	31
9. Conclusions on the consortium's joint actions during the West Sumatra response.....	31
10. Recommendations by ECB Indonesia member agencies	33
Annexes	35

Annex 1: Terms of reference	35
Annex 2: Joint evaluation schedule	41
Annex 3: Number of participants at village level.....	42
Annex 4: Joint evaluation participants	43
Annex 5: CARE’s Emergency Response to the West Sumatera Earthquake.....	45
Annex 6: Catholic Relief Services Emergency Response to the West Sumatera Earthquake	48
Annex 7: Mercy Corps Emergency Response to the West Sumatera Earthquake	50
Annex 8: Save The Children’s Emergency Response to the West Sumatera Earthquake	53
Annex 9: World Vision Indonesia’s Emergency Response to the West Sumatera Earthquake	56
Annex 10: The Stories	59
Annex 11: Other recommendations	64
Annex 12: References	66

1. Introduction

Earthquakes and other types of natural disasters are constant occurrences in many parts of Indonesia. On 2 September 2009 West Java was hit by an earthquake measuring 7.4 on the Richter Scale (RS). This was followed over the next day by two earthquakes measuring 5.1RS and 5.4RS respectively. Much damage occurred across the province of West Java and there was some loss of life. On 30 September West Sumatra was struck by an earthquake measuring 7.6RS. This was followed by a 6.2RS earthquake the same day and a third 7.0RS earthquake in two surrounding provinces the next day. The extent of damage and loss of life from the West Sumatra Earthquake was the worst seen since the December 2004 tsunami.

Various members of the eight member Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) consortium in Indonesia responded to both the West Java and West Sumatra earthquakes. In December 2009 all members of the ECB consortium in Indonesia agreed to commission an independent evaluation of the consortium's responses to these earthquakes. The eight ECB members formed a Steering Committee of four to oversee the evaluation. Committee members agreed to the objectives and methods that would be used by the evaluation team.

The evaluation objectives³ were to :

1. Review the ECB Indonesia consortium's emergency responses to the West Java and West Sumatra earthquakes, measured in terms of the ECB goal to improve the speed, quality and effectiveness of the humanitarian community to save lives, protect the livelihoods, and defend the rights of people in emergency situations. This review will include both the *process* of collaboration and the *results* of the actual program in West Sumatra.
2. Review the levels and degree of coordination of the consortium members as a group with the National, Provincial and District governments and the BNPB, and other key stakeholders including other INGOs, national NGOs, UN agencies and donors.
3. Define recommendations for improving the collaboration in emergency response in the future. The recommendations will inform future protocols and guidelines of collaboration and joint response for both the Indonesia consortium and the other ECB country level consortia.

2. The joint evaluation team and process

The evaluation took place from 16 February to 7 March, 2010.⁴ Evaluation methods used included document review, key informant reviews, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, observation and interactive workshops.

The team was led by an independent evaluator. CARE, CRS and WVI provided staff to be a part of the evaluation team; two were from CRS and one was from each of the other agencies. Each person could dedicate only a limited number of days for the evaluation. Two staff members joined the team to do

³ Please see Annex 1 for the joint evaluation's terms of reference.

⁴ Please see Annex 2 for a detailed schedule of the joint evaluation.

evaluative work in West Sumatra. One of them was involved in the West Sumatra response and the ECB consortium and the other was not. Both participated in an interagency workshop in Jakarta on 2 March and one continued to provide support in report writing after the workshop. One team member was a West Sumatra response manager and could only provide a few days to the team. The fourth member provided support during the first week of the evaluation in Jakarta and in design of the interagency workshop on 2 March.

Due to the more limited size of the team than planned originally and the level of knowledge⁵ of team members about the response, the evaluation focused its attention on assessing the effectiveness of the consortium's actions to improve the speed, quality and effectiveness of the West Sumatra response. The West Java response was used for comparing the effectiveness of the consortium's actions together only. No documents on West Java were reviewed and a visit was not made to response programs underway by the ECB agencies there. Views described on West Java are based on interviews with respective ECB member staff, including the Directors of member agencies.

A field visit was made to West Sumatra. Due to time and staff constraints only a snapshot is provided of the response by these agencies in West Sumatra. While seven ECB member agencies responded in West Sumatra, this snapshot primarily focuses on the work of five ECB member agencies that participated in an Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funded emergency response program. These agencies are CARE, CRS, Mercy Corps, Save the Children and WVI.

Each of these five agencies selected a village for the evaluation team to visit. These five different villages were in two districts that were severely affected by the earthquake. Criteria for village selection were severity of earthquake effects; inclusion of the village in the OFDA funded program and the distance of the village to within a two and half hour radius of Padang City.⁶ Two members of the evaluation team worked together and visited two agency programs and the villages where they worked. To reduce bias these staff did not visit their agency's program. They also conducted interviews with external agencies. The lead evaluator worked with a Minang–English translator and visited the programs of three member agencies, spending a day in a village served by a specific agency.

Prior to visiting each village, the agency implementing staff provided a program brief to the team. At village level focus groups were conducted with men and women separately that had benefited under the OFDA funded program. A key informant interview was conducted with the village leader and random interviews were done with village residents. In addition team members walked around the village to observe housing conditions, the sector most severely affected by the earthquake.⁷

The rest of the evaluation process concentrated on hearing the views of staff on the response and the ECB consortium. This process included in-depth discussions with each director of the eight ECB member agencies. Individual discussions were conducted with three ECB project management team (PMT)

⁵ There was only one staff person on the evaluation team for two weeks with in-depth knowledge about the emergency response programs by the agencies in West Sumatra and the ECB. This person was the CRS West Sumatra Program M&E officer.

⁶ The city of Padang is the capital of West Sumatra.

⁷ Please Annex 3 for a summary of those we met at village level.

members and the ECB Indonesia field facilitator (FF). An interagency workshop with emergency response staff of six ECB member agencies was held in Padang, West Sumatra on the 20th of February. The workshop focused on what was done by the consortium and how it affected the speed, quality and effectiveness of the response by each agency. Emergency response staff from the seventh ECB member agency that was responding in West Sumatra was interviewed separately in Jakarta. In addition, two members of the ECB Global Project team based in the United Kingdom were interviewed.

Key informant interviews were conducted with the following external agencies: OFDA representatives in Jakarta, a local NGO partner in West Sumatra, government officials of Padang and Padang Pariaman districts, two staff of the shelter cluster and an INGO partner that had provided technical assistance on transitional shelter in West Sumatra to five of the ECB member agencies.⁸

Information from all sources was summarized and the findings presented and reviewed during an interactive workshop on 2 March. The workshop was attended by seven ECB member agencies. Workshop participants drew conclusions and prioritized recommendations. A draft report was then written that captured the findings and conclusions from all these processes. The draft report was reviewed by consortium members in Indonesia. This final report takes into account the feedback received from agencies in Indonesia. The report is primarily for learning purposes and secondarily for accountability purposes.

The main criteria⁹ the evaluation team used to focus the evaluation were:

- Coverage by all ECB agencies in West Sumatra and the types of people served.
- The appropriateness of the activities carried out.
- The quality of the response in terms of how agencies involved and informed beneficiaries about their programs.
- Effectiveness in terms of the speed of the response, the needs assessment process and the use of standards.
- The immediate impacts of the programs.
- The effectiveness of coordination between member agencies and with other partners and the GOI.

3. The structure of the report

The next section of this report provides a brief history of ECB in Indonesia. This is followed by an overview of the actions undertaken by the ECB agencies following the earthquake in West Java on 2nd of September 2009. Section six summarizes the findings on the West Sumatra response and section seven the views of external agencies about ECB or the independent members of the ECB. The final sections focus on the actions of the consortium during the West Java and West Sumatra responses drawing out both the successes and challenges faced as the consortium went beyond the scope of its design as a capacity building mechanism. Additional action tested the relationships between members who

⁸ Please see Annex 4 for the names of all those who participated in the evaluation.

⁹ Definitions of most criteria, except that for impact, are from the ALNAP Guide on Evaluating Humanitarian Action Using the OECD – DAC criteria. The definition of impact used is from the ECB Good Enough Guide.

individually were preoccupied with trying to respond quickly to a large scale disaster. The final sections summarize the main conclusions and recommendations.

4. A brief history of ECB in Indonesia

The Emergency Capacity Building Project was launched in 2005.¹⁰ Its goal was to improve the speed, quality and effectiveness of the humanitarian community in saving lives, improving welfare and protecting the rights of people in emergency situations.¹¹ The project had three objectives one of which was to develop the disaster risk reduction (DRR) capacity of participating agencies within participating countries. This was the area of work that ECB member agencies in Indonesia participated in during ECB phase I.

Collaborative work on DRR strengthened the relationships between member agency staff in Indonesia. The staff working on DRR were often the same staff that were responsible for responding to emergencies. In 2007, these staff agreed to test an emergency needs assessment tool developed at the ECB global level. Their first assessment was done following an earthquake in Solok, West Sumatra, in 2007. This needs assessment was conducted by CARE, Mercy Corps and STC together. Based on the findings, Mercy Corps and STC responded to the earthquake; coordinating closely from the same office and even issuing joint situation reports during the initial stages of their responses.¹²

For ECB agencies, collaboration on initial needs assessments following a disaster began to be a norm. Often this meant collecting needs assessment data separately and sharing the findings over the phone. This assisted ECB member agencies to have a fuller picture of conditions on the ground after a disaster and to decide how they would each respond independently. Bilateral collaboration between ECB member agencies during a response did occur. This was voluntary collaboration and not usually formalized in writing.

ECB phase II started in 2008 and will continue until 2013. The project goal has remained the same. The ECB objective for participating countries is to improve **field-level** capacity to prepare for and respond to emergencies in disaster-prone countries. Agencies in Indonesia that volunteered to participate in phase II were CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, Save the Children, and World Vision Indonesia. Two new agencies joined the Indonesian ECB consortium. They were the

¹⁰ The first phase of the ECB project was from 2005 – 2008. It was a collaborative effort of seven agencies of the Inter-agency Working Group on Emergency Capacity: CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, Save the Children, and World Vision International.

¹¹ For complete details of the achievements of the ECB project during phase I see The ECB Final Project Report, June 2008.

¹² Reference Draft Case Study: Joint Needs Assessment in the West Sumatra Earthquake, page 2.

International Medical Corps (IMC) and Masyarakat Penanggulangan Bencana Indonesia (MPBI) or the Indonesian Society of Disaster Management.

At the start of phase II a lead agency for the ECB project in Indonesia was selected. This was CRS who was selected during an ECB consortia meeting by consensus. ECB members also agreed to the involvement of two new members in the ECB Indonesia consortia. These were IMC and MPBI. The ECB lead agency was provided funds to hire and manage a field facilitator. The field facilitator is responsible for coordinating ECB project activities across the ECB member agencies within Indonesia. The first field facilitator for phase II was hired in March and resigned in May. A new field facilitator was recruited in August 2009. He resigned in December 2009 and an offer for a third field facilitator had been made but not yet accepted at the time of this report.

The structure for phase I and II are the same in that each ECB member agency appointed a staff member to be an ECB project management team (PMT) member. Most of the PMT members selected in phase II had also worked in phase I. PMT members meet each month and many of them are senior staff and the emergency response manager for their agency. The field facilitator coordinates meetings and supports implementation of PMT agreed joint activities. Decisions in meetings are made through consensus. However the types of decisions that PMT members can make are not well defined. Agreed activities are defined in a consortium engagement plan (CEP). The CEP was developed in mid-2009 and focuses on building the capacity of agencies to respond to disasters. There are many objectives and activities in the CEP including those to improve staff capacity on beneficiary accountability. Different members of the consortium agreed to take the lead for implementing a specific CEP objective.

One CEP objective was *'to improve the capacities of ECB members and stakeholders to demonstrate timely responses'*.¹³ The activities centered on development of a joint preparedness or contingency plan for emergency response. Oxfam volunteered to lead on this objective and PMT members met twice in mid 2009 to discuss contingency plan development. A table of contents was agreed and member agencies have sent their agency's preparedness plans to Oxfam to summarize findings. Details of what would be done jointly and how during an emergency response was not yet defined.

The CEP does not define any specific activities to be done jointly during an emergency response, nor the roles of the ECB lead agency in Indonesia or the field facilitator if and when agencies decide to do more joint activities during an emergency. The documentation on ECB at the global level describes how consortium collaboration at country level would *'...allow joint response activities to develop organically'*.¹⁴

PMT members interviewed as part of this evaluation spoke of the trust, collaboration and positive communication processes that have developed between PMT members since ECB phase I or, over the last five years. Over this time some agency directors had delegated clear authority to their PMTs to make decisions on behalf of their agency but remained well briefed on the objectives and progress being

¹³ Please see the ECB Indonesia Consortium Engagement Plan – Final 15 August 2009, for details on the consortium's objectives and activities.

¹⁴ Emergency Capacity Building Project Phase II Proposal, p.22.

made by the consortium. However, a few agencies had new country directors who were less familiar with ECB, the rationale for collaboration between these agencies in Indonesia and the norms of how consortium members have historically worked together.

5. The West Java earthquake and the response by ECB member agencies

The West Java earthquake took place on September 2, 2009. The National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) report on the effects of the West Java earthquake as of March 2010 is that 80 people were killed and 1,152 people were injured. Immediately following the earthquake 178,490 people were displaced.¹⁵ An estimated 46,813 houses were heavily damaged, 94,674 moderately damaged and 116,265 lightly damaged. The damage was spread widely across twelve districts.

Following the earthquake, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) announced that no international assistance was needed. *'This caused confusion and hesitancy among NGOs'* (an ECB Director). INGOs with in-country agreements could respond but without international media attention, which never occurred, it was difficult for INGOs to raise funds. The response by all actors to this emergency was hesitant and OCHA was never well established in West Java. The needs of people across West Java have reminded unclear.

On September 3rd CRS, Mercy Corps, Oxfam, STC and WVI sent teams into West Java. Prior to going CRS as the ECB lead agency had called members to discuss whether responding members would carry out a joint needs assessment. They all agreed to use the JNA tool. Mercy Corps sent one staff member to join the CRS assessment team. Otherwise each agency did the needs assessment in a separate geographic area and involved their local NGO partners and GOI officials in the needs assessment process. Some of agencies completed the entire JNA form and others completed sections for the sectors of most interest to their agency. Distances between geographic areas were large. Meeting together was difficult and agency needs assessment teams never met together for a training and orientation on the use of the JNA tool. The data was not compiled nor a needs assessment report produced.

Needs assessment findings and the planned response by each agency were shared by phone and email by PMT members.¹⁶ Also PMT members met at least twice in Jakarta to discuss collaboration options. CRS and Oxfam collaborated on distribution of shelter tarpaulins, with one providing tarpaulins for emergency shelter and the other agency providing logistical support for its distribution. Two other agencies collaborated on WASH activities. These collaborative activities were agreed between PMT members directly in West Java. Oxfam obtained \$80K from OCHA for NFIs. They considered cooperating with other ECB agencies in utilizing these funds but they had to use the NFIs quickly as the agency's rule is that their relief response must start on day 3 of an emergency.

¹⁵ Numbers for those displaced by the earthquake are from the OCHA Situation Report #6, 17th September. All other numbers in this paragraph are based on data provided during a BNPB meeting on West Java held on the 10th March 2010.

¹⁶ Many PMT members were sent into West Java as the emergency response managers for their agency.

Following the needs assessment process, the five ECB member agencies did emergency relief distribution programs during September in separate parts of West Java. Only Mercy Corps and Oxfam continued their programs in West Java beyond September and they are currently doing early recovery activities. Given the slow pace of recovery in West Java, CRS and WVI are now planning to go back into West Java to support recovery programs.

The overall response by the GOI and INGOs was not sufficient to provide a strong base of recovery for people in West Java. As of February 2010, people are reported to be still living in tents. OCHA has pleaded with agencies to not forget Java. They have called it a ‘forgotten disaster’.

6. The West Sumatra earthquake

6.1 The context

The West Sumatra earthquakes on the 30th of September and a third on the 1st of October affected 13 out of 19 districts in West Sumatra and mildly affected two surrounding provinces. As of the 15th of October 2009 the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB)¹⁷ confirmed that the earthquakes had killed 1,117 people, 2 people were missing and 2,902 people were injured. Housing was the most severely damaged sector. The GOI’s initial estimate was that 200,712 houses were severely or moderately damaged¹⁸. This was later reduced to 181,066 houses.¹⁹ The Sumatra Humanitarian Response Plan was issued by the United Nations in coordination with the GOI on the 9th of October. This estimated that 250,000 families (1,250,000 people) were affected by a total or partial loss of their homes and livelihoods.²⁰ This is approximately 25% of the population of the province of West Sumatra.²¹ The estimated cost of earthquake and subsequent landslide damage was US \$2.3 billion.²²

The GOI welcomed international assistance. There was extensive international and national media coverage on the effects of the disaster. While the city of Padang was affected with extensive damage to government buildings, much of the earthquake damage was widely scattered in rural and peri-urban areas across six districts.

The GOI declared a one month emergency period to be followed by an early recovery period which was to last from November to April 2010. The GOI responded quickly with food and cash for food. GOI support to housing, the most severely affected sector, is yet to happen and is currently scheduled to take place in June or July. The support will be in the form of cash grants to homeowners for house renovation or construction. The grants will be Rupiah 15 million for destroyed or severely damaged

¹⁷ UNOCHA Indonesia Earthquake Situation Report #15, 15 October 2009.

¹⁸ UNOCHA Indonesia Earthquake Situation Report #17, 23 October 2009

¹⁹ IASC Indonesia Shelter Cluster, District Level Summary of Shelter Support, 17 February 2010.

²⁰ UNOCHA – Earthquake Situation Report # 14, 13 October 2009.

²¹ West Sumatra Earthquake Humanitarian Response Plan in Coordination with the Government of Indonesia, 9th October, p.1.

²² BNPB, West Sumatra and Jambi Natural Disasters: Damage and Loss and Preliminary Needs Assessment, 30 October p. xii.

houses, Rupiah 10 million for moderately damaged houses and Rupiah 1 million²³ for a slightly damaged house.²⁴

In addition to the response by the GOI, relatives, individuals from within Indonesia and other countries, the Red Cross and donors provided immediate relief assistance. Over 300 INGOs and local NGOs responded to the disaster. Many NGOs concentrated their efforts in the most severely affected district of Padang Pariaman. The UN clusters for Shelter, WASH, Health, Education and Protection, Agriculture, Early Recovery, Logistics, and Telecommunications were established in the first week and government officials participated in some of the early cluster coordination meetings. At present, the clusters that are still active are for Shelter, Health, WASH, Early Recovery and Education. District government officials of Pariaman City and Padang Pariaman are currently taking a more active role in coordination.

The shelter cluster was considered particularly well managed; facilitating coordination between agencies on NFI distributions and an agreed transitional shelter standard by the end of October.²⁵ It also provided agencies with timely information management which helped cluster members to plan their responses. Even with this coordination effort villagers and leaders in two of the villages we visited reported that there was a large amount of duplication by NGOs.²⁶

6.2 The response by ECB member agencies

Seven of the Indonesian ECB member agencies responded in West Sumatra. They are CARE, CRS, IMC, Mercy Corps, Oxfam, STC and WVI. Of the seven, only Mercy Corps had an existing program in West Sumatra. All other members sent in assessment teams on the 1st or 2nd of October.

IMC did their needs assessment as they implemented emergency primary health care mobile services. They were invited to be part of the JNA process but their headquarters requested they use their own internal assessment tools as these were more comprehensive for gathering data on health status and needs. They received information about the most affected areas from the health cluster led by World Health Organization (WHO). IMC received a substantial grant from OFDA to run mobile health clinics and funds for basic medicines. Their program was operating by October 2nd and will continue through March 2010. It has provided mobile clinic services to 19,033 people and health capacity training in three sub-districts of Padang Pariaman.

Following the earthquake six of the other ECB agencies used the needs assessment tool that was developed in ECB Phase I. With an existing program in Padang Mercy Corps declared they would lead in West Sumatra and compile assessment data and submit it to OCHA on behalf of ECB agencies. Mercy Corps will be referred to as the West Sumatra lead agency throughout the rest of the report.²⁷ This is in contrast to CRS the ECB lead agency in Indonesia. The West Sumatra lead agency offered other ECB

²³ The Indonesia Rupiah to the US dollar exchange rate in March 2010 was around Rupiah9,333 to US\$1.

²⁴ Ibid, p. xiv.

²⁵ Please see the Padang shelter cluster website for the T-shelter standard agreed.

²⁶ Duplication is used here to mean the distribution of the same items by different NGOs.

²⁷ Details of the JNA process, rules of ECB engagement and fundraising and resource use by ECB members during the West Sumatra Response are provided in Annex 10: The Stories.

agencies the use of their office in Padang City and introduced some ECB members to government officials.

Meetings on the joint assessment were held in the WS lead agency office in Padang on the 1st and 2nd of October and included other agencies beyond ECB agencies. Geographic areas for data collection were defined and each of the many agencies involved in the needs assessment process collected data separately or with local partners. The assessment data from CRS, Mercy Corps and WVI and some other agencies was compiled by the WS lead agency and submitted to OCHA on the 5th of October for inclusion in OCHA's assessment report. A draft report summarizing assessment findings was released by OCHA on October 7th 2009. Two separate learning case studies have since been drafted on the joint needs assessment experience in West Sumatra. Some of the details from these studies cases are described in Annex 10 in the story of the JNA and they are not repeated here.

A main issue for the purpose of this evaluation is whether ECB agencies could use the joint assessment data and whether the JNA process provided other advantages during the emergency response. Some of the agencies reported that the data did assist them in initial planning of their programs. At least two claimed that it was insufficient for initial planning purposes and they did another assessment. However, West Sumatra field staff of four of the OFDA grant recipient agencies and Oxfam field staff reported that information sharing during the needs assessment process and during subsequent ECB meetings in Padang to discuss geographic target areas helped them to plan their work better geographically. *'Agency staff knew one another. This enabled information to be shared at ECB meetings and bilaterally. This minimized overlapping of distributions in the same areas'* (Padang workshop staff views). All six of these ECB member agencies received funds from their respective headquarter offices to start up their relief activities immediately.

6.3 Coverage

All seven of the ECB agencies responding in West Sumatra had started their relief programs by the end of the first week. They all concentrated their relief efforts in villages that were badly affected by the earthquake. Of the five villages visited by the evaluation team, in one village 65% of the houses were badly damaged and the rest moderately²⁸ damaged. In the other 4 villages 80% or above of the houses were severely damaged. The type of activities carried out and the coverage achieved by six of the ECB agencies that were providing NFIs and some other support is presented below.

²⁸ The difference between severely and moderately damaged houses was disputed and there was no agreed standard for clearly defining the difference between severe and moderate within the shelter cluster compared to that set by the GOI. Often there was little difference between severe and moderately damaged houses.

Coverage by ECB member agencies²⁹

Agency	NFIs (HH)	T-Shelter (HH)	Other activities
CARE	13,956 ³⁰	3,400 ³¹	WASH – activities were carried out during NFI distributions
Catholic Relief Services	8,700	10,000	
Mercy Corps	10,400	3,500	Hygiene: 4,000 HHs Rain water catchment: 2,700HHs
Save the Children	30,000	630	Child Protection: 26 CFS (tent) Education: emergency support to 111 schools Health: 60 schools for Hygiene Promotion and 54 Posyandu
World Vision Indonesia	14,350		WASH- 12,000 HHs 3,000 students in 20 schools Health- IEC: 5,000 people 4 Puskemas 50 Posyandu Mobile clinic: 1,668 people
Oxfam	15,237	3,297	
Total HHs	92,643	20,827	
Total population (times 5)	463,215		

As shown in the above table ECB agencies together have provided some form of relief support to an estimated 37% of the people affected by the earthquake. This was a sizeable contribution and it was possible because all six ECB member agencies had funds from multiple sources. The funds that the five member agencies received under a common OFDA grant represented only 10% of total funds for one agency and an estimated 20-30% for others.³²

6.4 Programs under consortia grants

The remaining parts of this section focus on the response in West Sumatra by the five ECB agencies that received funds under two separate grants to do similar activities. The first grant was from USAID for immediate relief activities for US\$300,000. CARE, Mercy Corps and WVI utilized these funds and Oxfam recommended inclusion of a local partner in the USAID grant. The second grant was from OFDA for US\$3million. This was for NFIs and immediate emergency and transitional shelter and WASH activities

²⁹ Data in the above table was provided either by the ECB agency or the shelter cluster.

³⁰ CARE distributed different types of NFIs. The largest number of HHs reached was with emergency shelter for 13,956HHs. 6,743of these HHs received household shelter kits, 7,362HHs communal shelter kits and 7,887HHs household kits.

³¹ CARE's T-Shelter program has completed beneficiary selection and will start implementation March 1, 2010. The approach will be similar to that used by CRS; providing a cash grant for purchase of materials and technical support and advice to homeowners on constructing safe and earthquake resistant T-Shelters.

³² The percentage of OFDA funding in relation to the total emergency response funds for any given agency was not possible to calculate as collection of all funding data for each agency fell outside the scope of this evaluation.

that would reduce the suffering and vulnerability of disaster affected people. Agencies participating in this consortium grant were CARE, CRS, Mercy Corps, Save the Children and World Vision Indonesia.

Activities were independently implemented by each of the five participating agencies. They did meet to agree geographic areas on which to focus and to broadly discuss the programs they were carrying out. The evaluation team visited one village of each of the five agencies participating in the OFDA grant to understand how well the agencies were achieving the OFDA grant purpose. Findings from the village visits are summarized below.³³

The appropriateness of the activities carried out

According to the village people and leaders met during the evaluation the biggest common needs across the villages were for food, shelter or a place to sleep, and ‘money for life’. Other needs mentioned but not in all the villages were: 1) medicine in two villages with the explanation in one village that people became sick from sleeping outside because it was raining heavily everyday; 2) latrines in one village; 3) toolkits for salvaging materials in two villages; 4) water in one village; and 5) clothes in one village because of the heavy rains.

NFI distribution: All five agencies distributed NFIs. These were equally distributed in villages to those households (HHs) with damaged houses. There were no reports of inequitable distribution of NFIs.

People appreciated all of the various NFIs kits distributed as they met immediate needs. Only in one village did women say that they had not received sufficient tarpaulins and tents (emergency shelter) from any responder to meet their immediate needs. The Shelter Cluster’s Joint Monitoring Report of December 2009, notes *‘there appeared to be a significant gap between shelter tools needed and owned’*.³⁴ Otherwise there is no evidence that NFI needs were not met by one of the multiple responders to this disaster.

However, overlapping distribution by ECB members to the same areas was reported to have happened a little by two agencies and more by one agency (reported by staff implementing in the field).

Four agencies provided some form of transitional support and two agencies WASH support. All activities were appropriate given the needs but effectiveness of activities varied. Effectiveness is discussed below.

The quality of the response or how agencies involved and informed beneficiaries about their programs

All 5 agencies had informed local leaders about the work they would do in the village and some reported progress to the leaders. Four agencies worked with some form of committee but on different types of activities. One agency had involved local people directly and this was very much appreciated. As seen from the notes below, agencies work very differently with local people. Some ECB agencies

³³ Detailed findings from each of the villages visited by the evaluation team are provided in Annexes 5 to 9.

³⁴ IASC Shelter Cluster Monitoring Report of December 2009.

provide clear information to beneficiaries and involve them in decisions and others do not seem to do this well.

In the village visited on behalf of CARE, people there said that CARE had arrived in the village two days after the earthquake. They completed a needs assessment and during it asked the men what were their most pressing needs. A week later they started distributing NFIs directly to the people *'everyday to everyone'*. CARE always informed the leader and men about the activities that the agency would carry out and the dates when activities would be done. People knew the qualifying criteria for all activities. Men said they felt respected. Women reported they were not informed and wanted to be consulted as *'we know best what is needed by our family'*. Everyone knew CARE well and wanted them to continue working in the village. Many other NGOs had come to this village after the earthquake to distribute NFIs. They did not involve local people or ask them about their needs. Men in this village said they felt disrespected by many NGOs.

In the village visited on behalf of Mercy Corps people said that Mercy Corps had worked in the village prior to the earthquake (since December 2009) on disaster preparedness. Mercy Corps staff arrived in the village two days after the earthquake and completed a needs assessment. They started distributing NFIs on day 4. Villagers said that after the earthquake Mercy Corps had involved local leaders and the local NGO partner in NFI distribution and they were not involved in decisions but everyone with severely damaged houses received NFIs equally. Mercy Corps had also distributed vouchers to families from purchase of materials for house repair. In the sub village we visited families had received voucher support for T-shelters. However, no one seemed comfortable or clear about the criteria for selection of the sub-villages³⁵ and beneficiaries that had received vouchers. Some villagers recommended ways to define criteria in future when agency resources are limited and these are described further below. Everyone appreciated all the work by Mercy Corps especially the WASH and disaster preparedness support. They want both types of activities to continue and the leader wanted DRR support to be extended into other villages. Many other NGOs had come to this village after the earthquake and according to the men duplication of NFI distribution had occurred.

In the village visited on behalf of CRS people said that CRS had arrived in the village three days after the earthquake, done an assessment and started immediately to distribute directly to the people. People had little to say about the NFIs but much to say about the T-shelter program. They knew the qualifying criteria for receipt of the T-shelter cash grant. They appreciated that cash grants had been distributed quickly and that homeowners were able to use them flexibly for purchase of any type of house reconstruction materials. They said that CRS staff along with community shelter committee members monitored house to house to verify progress. They had no other comments regarding CRS.

In the villages visited on behalf of STC and WVI people had little feedback for these agencies. These agencies had worked mostly with the local leaders when distributing NFIs. The men and women in the respective villages visited by the JE team could describe the various types of NFI support received from these two ECB member agencies but they could not say who had provided the NFIs. In one village they

³⁵ This village had 19 sub-villages. Vouchers were distributed in seven out of the 19 sub-villages.

asked to know who had provided the assistance so they could thank the agency. STC had started a T-shelter program in one of the villages visited by the JE team. The program was creating disquiet within the village as villagers are not clear about the criteria for beneficiary selection in the program and the need for shelter assistance in the village is high.

Effectiveness in terms of needs assessment and response speed and the use of standards

All five ECB agencies had carried out rapid needs assessment quickly during the first week. In three of the villages people reported that ECB agencies had started distributing 3-4 days after the earthquake. In two of the villages they reported that ECB agencies had started distributing NFIs kits in their village in mid-October. CRS had completed all NFI distribution by mid November. The other agencies completed NFI distribution by the end of December.

The types of NFI kits distributed by ECB member agencies were not all the same. For instance CRS only provided emergency shelter kits while CARE and STC provided multiple types of kits with many different items in each.³⁶ All agencies stated that they followed Sphere standards for NFI distribution. The evaluation team did not have time to verify with staff how they specifically used Sphere standards when designing their NFI kits. In the five villages visited everyone claimed they had needed and used all the materials received. There were no complaints about NFIs and villages were not aware of the differences in distribution across the villages by ECB member agencies. This may well have been because so many other NGOs had distributed NFIs after the West Sumatra earthquake.

CARE, CRS, Mercy Corps and STC are providing transitional or T-shelter support: one via vouchers and three via cash grants. The speed at which agencies started these programs and their effectiveness vary. Mercy Corps provided 3,500 households a Rupiah 700,000³⁷ voucher to purchase housing reconstruction materials by the end of December. Villagers receiving this support were grateful for it but claimed it was too small to obtain much material for house repair or reconstruction. Housing destruction across this village was indeed large and the need for support to rebuild and repair housing is great.³⁸ Fishermen living in this village said *'without a safe place for our families to sleep we are spending time trying to deal with house repairs and little time on fishing'*.

CARE, CRS and Save the Children are providing T-shelter support using cash grants. The CRS and STC cash grant programs are already underway and each is providing house-owners a Rupiah 2.5 million grant to purchase housing renovation materials. STC will provide 630T-shelters and has completed 8. CRS has concentrated its program almost exclusively on T-shelters. It will provide 10,000 T-shelters and

³⁶ A complete list of all NFIs distributed from October to December 2009 was brought together by a member of the evaluation team. This was to understand the type of standard agencies were applying when distributing NFIs and providing shelter support. The information took considerable effort for the evaluation member to collect. It does provide real data for participating agencies to review what happened during this response and the appropriateness of moving towards a more consistent standard for distribution of relief items so that social envy is avoided.

³⁷ The dollar value of the voucher is approximately US\$75.00. The value of the cash grants are approximately US\$268.00.

³⁸ During transect walks through two of the villages it was observed that many families were living in unsafe houses and others living on verandas. This brings much disquiet to families about the safety of their children as almost weekly small earthquakes continue to occur.

has completed 2,562. This program appears to be the most effective in speeding local recovery and seems to apply the learning from previous earthquakes.³⁹ CARE has committed to provide 3,400 T-shelters. They will start their program March 1, 2010.⁴⁰ Most people in each village knew of these T-shelter programs in detail and had much to say (see below). All four agencies have used Build Change⁴¹ to provide technical training and advice to homeowners in T-shelter construction so that it is earthquake resistant. Villagers commented on the lateness of support by CARE and STC in implementing T-shelter programs.

CARE and Mercy Corps carried out WASH activities including construction of temporary latrines. Only in one village served by Mercy Corps did local people and the village leader speak about WASH activities. In this case hygiene promotion was community based and done during construction of temporary latrines and water catchment systems. The effectiveness of the program was evident in that latrines were well used and clean and people claimed behaviours were changing. CARE did hygiene promotion as part of their NFI distribution. There was no evidence of the effectiveness of this program as no one at village level described it at all.

Some of the ECB agencies carried out other activities that were not part of the OFDA grant. This included provision of child friendly spaces to reduce children's trauma, school based education and WASH programs. In addition WVI has provided extensive support to the health sector. Only in one village did men describe the children's activities and how much they helped to reduce their children's trauma after the earthquake. Mercy Corps had implemented DRR activities in one of the villages prior to the earthquake. Local capacity on disaster preparedness was built and the capacities were effectively used by the local community following the earthquake as the organized and evacuated to higher ground following the earthquake. This is discussed more below.

The immediate intended and unintended impacts of the programs

People described the immediate impacts of NFI receipt. Many of the impacts cited by local people were those intended by the program. They included *'it met an urgent need as we had lost everything'*, the shelter kits *'provided us with a place to sleep out of the rain'* and *'it reduced our anxiety and helped us focus on other activities such as house repairs and work in the fields'*.

The T-shelter support programs are having both intended and unintended impacts. In the village where CRS had started providing cash grants for material purchase in mid-November, many households have a safe and well structured transitional shelter in which they are living. In this village we heard that *'with a safe place to sleep we are able to concentrate on working in the fields'*. This village appeared to have recovered the most from the earthquake and villagers said conditions are back to normal.

³⁹ See Cosgrove, *Learning from earthquake relief and recovery operations*, p. 14-17.

⁴⁰ Shelter Cluster Report of 17 February 2010, shows that the commitments of all agencies working on shelter in West Sumatra were only meeting 32% of transitional shelter needs.

⁴¹ Build Change is an US based INGO that specialises in providing technical support on construction of earthquake resistant houses. It was sub-granted a portion of the OFDA grant to provide technical assistance to each of the ECB member agencies and other agencies working in West Sumatra on T-shelter.

The STC T-shelter program is just starting and is providing the same size cash grant as that of CRS. It is in a village adjacent to villages where CRS is implementing its T-shelter program. Villagers tended to compare the two programs in terms of their speed and the clarity in which the program was communicated. The number of families that will benefit under the STC program is relatively small in comparison to the large number of houses destroyed across the area. Villagers did not know the beneficiary selection criteria for qualifying households of the STC program and said that the contrast with the adjacent program and the poor socialization on criteria was leading to *'social envy'*.

CARE's T-shelter program will be implemented in March 2010. Villagers noted that the program was late.⁴² In this village a non-ECB agency started to provide emergency shelter directly to households with severely damaged houses in February 2010. There was no discussion with villagers as the agency went directly to individual households and explained what they would do. The villagers disliked the way this non-ECB agency had entered the village and not spoken to the larger community. There is much disquiet because CARE has explained their T-shelter program in detail including the criteria, one of which is that those who receive T-shelter support from another NGO will not qualify for T-shelter support from CARE. The level of T-shelter support from CARE will be more substantial. Because of differences in T-shelter support social tension and envy is expected to occur.

In the Mercy Corps T-shelter program using vouchers to obtain housing reconstruction or repair materials, the size of the voucher was too small to ensure families could repair houses to a level where they are safe as a place to sleep. In addition only households in 7 out of 19 sub-villages had received vouchers. Villagers said that the distribution of vouchers was unfair. They did not know the criteria for receipt of vouchers and claimed that the program has caused *'social envy'*.

Two other programs run by Mercy Corps were mentioned. One was the disaster preparedness program implemented before the earthquake. This program had worked with two villages to establish disaster preparedness committees. After the earthquake the committees had quickly evacuated people from the two villages. *'The evacuation was well organised'*. People said *'we are now prepared to respond when there is an earthquake or tsunami'*. They want Mercy Corps to continue this disaster preparedness work as well as the community based hygiene promotion activities done after the earthquake. They claimed the hygiene promotion activities had changed behaviours in that people were washing their hands more frequently and keeping their children and their houses cleaner.

Improvements and recommendations from village level

The recommendations below were made at village level either by focus group participants or leaders. The most frequently heard recommendation was on support to shelter. The recommendations were to increase shelter support coverage, the amount of the shelter cash grant and the value of vouchers. In addition some recommended that the timeliness of T-shelter support be improved in future.

Other commonly heard recommendations were on information provision to local people. Particularly villagers asked that ECB members provide clear criteria for all programs and communicate them widely.

⁴² Funding confirmation for CARE's T-shelter program was only received in January 2010.

In two villages they asked to be informed about the agency. Women in one village asked to be as involved in program discussions on needs and to keep them as informed of progress of men.

In two villages people asked that the ECB member agency working in their village to continue to do so until recovery is more complete.

In the same two villages the men particularly had recommendations for all NGOs. These were to improve coordination between NGOs and with the Government. They also wanted NGOs to coordinate with local people better and for NGOs to respect them.

6.5 The similarities and differences between ECB agency programs

The similar and differences between agency programs are striking. All agencies targeted their support to communities that were the most severely affected. They all distributed NFIs quickly that met immediate needs. However, each agency distributed different items and different types of kits and used different names for their NFI kits. The rationale for these differences is not clear and there was no evident consistency in what ECB agencies did on NFIs.

All ECB agencies informed community leaders when they began to work in a village. Three agencies worked closely with leaders during distribution and two worked more directly with local people. Due to the differences in relationships at community level some agencies were well known and others were not known at all. Of most concern is the difference in T-shelter support. In three of the communities visited the lack of clarity of beneficiary criteria is creating *'social tension and envy'*. Overall consistency in the way ECB agencies work with communities was not evident.

7. External views of the Indonesian ECB consortium

The evaluation team met with district government officials in two West Sumatra districts where ECB agencies are working. In addition the team met with: Build Change, an INGO partner in the OFDA grant which provided T-shelter technical support to five ECB member agencies; a local NGO partner of CRS and Oxfam; two representatives of the Shelter Cluster and two representatives from USAID/OFDA. Two members of the ECB Global project team were also interviewed. These various views are summarised below.

District government officials knew Mercy Corps because of its work in DRR over the last few years in West Sumatra. Officials of one district had heard of the ECB and officials in the other district had not. However, officials in both districts knew very little about the work of the other individual ECB agencies⁴³ or the progress they were making. Their reason for this was that *'there were too many NGOs responding in West Sumatra to know them all'*. They did appreciate the NFI distributions that had taken place quickly by many NGOs especially as the GOI had not provided such support. They welcomed the quick

⁴³ ECB agencies reported that they had sent plans to District officials when they started their work especially as GOI officials had to approve the work that agencies implement in a district.

support for T-shelters as the GOI support on housing is yet to be provided. Officials at the district level said they assumed the quality of the work was acceptable as they had received no complaints.

The INGO partner in the OFDA grant, Build Change, greatly valued working with five of the ECB agencies on T-shelter programs.⁴⁴ They noted that agreements on the technical services they would provide to homeowners in ECB member targeted villages were quickly agreed. Their relationships with these agencies provided them quick access to communities as ECB agencies would identify homeowners to participate in training workshops and venues for the workshops that were held. *'This made our work easy'*. The engagement with these agencies meant that *'we had greater coverage in providing technical provision for building earthquake resistant houses and we expect that this has enhanced the quality of the T-shelters built across West Sumatra'*.

One local NGO, Walhi, was interviewed. Walhi works with CRS and Oxfam. They valued the partnership with both agencies. They said that the speed of the response was quick compared to if they had just done the response by themselves and the ECB agency responses meant that more people were reached. They would work with both ECB members again especially with CRS who had helped them to develop their capacity on staff and financial management during the response itself.

The shelter cluster representatives noted that ECB agencies engaged with the cluster independently. They knew little about ECB. They knew the work of all ECB member agencies except for WVI. They knew the work of CRS very well. CRS had participated often in cluster meetings, provided updated information on their programs and quickly started their T-shelter program. They considered CRS's T-shelter program of good standard. Their concerns were about the different approaches, standards and timeframes for implementing T-shelter programs by NGOs in general, including by ECB member agencies.

The USAID/OFDA officials valued the speed in which ECB agencies implemented their programs and the broad coverage they achieved. OFDA would support the ECB consortium again if it made sense in terms of programming and the speed of the response. They stated that support for consortia during emergency responses was not a trend for OFDA. However, they considered it a good thing for OFDA to know that a group of partners that they work with globally function as a consortium well in a country that is prone to natural disasters.

At the ECB Global level, communication during the West Sumatra emergency response was taking place between the consortium field facilitator and the Global Field Manager. The global team considered the Indonesian consortium's decisions to conduct a joint needs assessment and jointly submit a proposal for funding emergency response activities a success as it demonstrated the will of members to collaborate in times of an emergency response. They were impressed by the consortium's willingness to conduct a joint evaluation and learn from working together. The project team acknowledges that pre-positioned agreements are critical to implementing a smoother joint response and encourage such agreements to be in place before the next big emergency in Indonesia.

⁴⁴ Build Change provided technical support for the T-shelter programs of CARE, CRS, Mercy Corps, Oxfam and STC as well as to non-ECB member agencies.

7.1 A summary of external views

External views of the ECB consortium indicate appreciation for the efforts made by consortium members, particularly on NFI distribution and of the widespread coverage achieved. The ECB consortium and its individual members are well known by the two NGOs interviewed as part of this evaluation. Both NGOs could describe how collaboration with ECB agencies had improved the speed, quality and effectiveness of their responses to the emergency. However the ECB and some of the member agencies are not well known among district government officials and by shelter cluster staff. If consortium members plan to advocate together during future responses they may need to ensure that the consortium is better known and that each of the members are applying standards more consistently.

8. The effectiveness of ECB's internal coordination

In contrast to the West Java response the consortium worked more together in West Sumatra on the joint needs assessment process. For the first time during an emergency response a consortium member publicly took the lead and pursued funds on behalf of the consortium for emergency response activities. This pursuit of funds brought in a number of agency directors who had previously delegated ECB matters to their PMT members. Many PMT members and the field facilitator were bypassed during October 2009. The pursuit of funding further raised many issues about the purpose of the consortium and how it operates.

Collaboration on a joint proposal for funds and more deliberate work to compile JNA information required ECB agency staff to meet more frequently in both Jakarta and Padang and to decide on clearer geographic targeting of resources. Beyond these actions, each agency worked independently to implement their West Sumatra emergency response programs which were funded both from consortium funds and from many other sources.

Designed primarily for building capacity in Indonesia, the trust, communications and collaboration that had developed between consortium members was tested as members struggled to act more widely together on a response. While collaboration between PMTs during an emergency response was common in Indonesia, the scale of the West Sumatra response and the deliberate action to raise funds for agencies jointly changed the dynamic between the agencies considerably.

The stories of what happened within the consortium from September 30th through February 2010 are set out in Annex 10. The stories center around three themes the evaluation team identified to analyze what they were hearing. The themes are interrelated. The first theme is on rules of engagement, the second on the joint needs assessment and the third on fundraising and resource use. Readers are encouraged to read the detailed stories as background. These combine areas are the ones that strained the relationships between ECB members during the West Sumatra response.

The context needs to be considered when reviewing the stories. *'The context of a large scale emergency made collaboration more difficult but also more important'*. Every agency was trying to act quickly. Given the urgency of emergency response, actions were taken by some ECB members in haste. This

included submission of a proposal on behalf of the consortium before it was reviewed by members. Such action initially raised suspicions about the motivation of members. Submission of consortium funding proposals brought in staff from the headquarters and regional offices of some agencies. This again added to the complexity.

The sections below summarize the successes and benefits that working more together in the West Sumatera response brought either to these agencies or to the response itself. In many ways these were considerable especially for learning purposes of what to do and what not to do during the next large scale emergency response. It then goes on to highlight the challenges and the learning. All of this section comes from interviews with staff in Indonesia from director to field level.

8.1 The successes and benefits of greater collaboration

Though painful at the time, most members said that it was *'good news'* that a genuine attempt was made to work more together on a response. ECB agencies got to know one another better and they shared information across the agencies more.⁴⁵ The actions taken had raised ECB's profile both with OCHA on the JNA and the donor for the consortium grants submitted.

A number of agencies benefited from the West Sumatra lead agency stepping in and committing to provide support on the ground. This included support with logistics, contacts with local government officials and on management of donor relationships. ECB agencies though questioned whether this level of support can be expected by all members present on the ground when an emergency strikes or whether West Sumatra was a one off event.

In addition agencies gained a fuller understanding of the overall response and were able to implement a widespread and sizeable program that reached more people affected by the disaster. This was done with a minimum level of overlap. In some ways they were able to become more accountable to local people as they knew what each other was doing and could provide information to local people about an ECB agency that was supposed to be working in a specific geographic area.

8.2 The challenges of collaborating more during a response

Funding and resource use

They were many challenges faced particularly during the first month of the response. A major one was trying to decide how to share and use resources provided under consortium grants so that the gains for beneficiaries could be maximized. There were no criteria in place which would allow for easy allocation of funds based on capacity to deliver effectively. Information was incomplete about needs on the ground, resource availability, commitments from donors and government plans. Discussions on fund allocations proved especially challenging as pressure from headquarters and regional offices for each agency to respond and raise resources were happening at the same time. As noted during the interagency workshop on March 2 *'ECB is good during "normal" times, but during an emergency*

⁴⁵ The PMTs share much information between themselves during emergency responses. Information sharing seemed to have gone beyond the PMT level to other levels of staff in these agencies in Indonesia.

situation, agencies naturally will try to prioritize their own needs, and only sometimes compromise with other agencies’.

Another challenge was that the message from the donor was not clear. Did they want individual applications or only a consortium application? Also a joint position from the global ECB principals⁴⁶ on the funding actions taken by the ECB Indonesian consortium members during the West Sumatra emergency response was not communicated. The ECB agencies in Indonesia only knew that the principals had met to discuss the Indonesian consortium’s actions but they did not know the outcome of their discussions. Views of the ECB global project team and agency managers on the actions being taken in Indonesia were also not communicated to all the ECB Indonesia members.⁴⁷

More meetings were necessary to reach agreement on fund allocations and on geographic targeting of resources. This required coordination on working areas. Additional meetings created additional strain on staff that were already overstretched in trying to implement an emergency relief program.

New emergency staff and communications

Some ECB member agencies brought in international response team members that work in large scale emergency responses. They were not familiar with ECB and the reasons why West Sumatra based staff were trying to collaborate. Their engagement in the response contributed to miscommunication and lack of coordination. PMT members were bypassed by some of these newcomers. The field facilitator was also bypassed both by outsiders and during many of the meetings held in Jakarta on funding arrangements. Communications became particularly unclear between Jakarta and Padang⁴⁸ on the procurement and NFI supplies that STC had committed to provide to some of the other ECB agencies distributing NFIs in West Sumatra and as a result these NFI supplies were never provided to the other ECB agencies.

Rules of engagement

In the chaos of the first few weeks of the emergency a number of communications were distributed on behalf of ECB by Mercy Corps with only the ECB and Mercy Corps logos on the documents. The logos of other agencies were not on the documents. Agencies questioned the intent of the distributing agency and how ECB should be branded.

Standard operating procedures did not exist for operating jointly within an emergency. This included for the allocation of resources during an emergency and for conducting the JNA. A JNA tool was available that agencies all used. Guidelines for use of the tool are not available. Procedures for agreeing who tabulates and analyses the data as well as who completes a report and disseminates it are not in place, though the PMT of the ECB lead agency had compiled the needs assessment data from a number of agencies following the earthquake in Papua in late 2008.

⁴⁶ The ECB principals are the emergency directors at global level for each of the ECB member agencies.

⁴⁷ The ECB Global Project Team was communicating with the field facilitator and encouraging him to become more active in supporting coordination between agencies during the response itself.

⁴⁸ Each agency director was responsible for communicating the agreements reached between ECB agencies to their respective managers in West Sumatra.

8.3 Major learnings

The learning from the West Sumatra response are that:

The ECB in Indonesia was designed for capacity building. Going beyond the agreed scope of the consortium has both benefits and risks. The benefits are that members learned more about each other and how to coordinate more during a major response. The risks are that relationships built between members over the last five years were damaged. Some rebuilding of trust is needed.

Pre-agreements or arrangements on joint action during a response are essential. This includes having standard operating procedures for any joint actions and some broad criteria for fund allocations from common proposals.

Roles and responsibilities during a response need to be clear. Role definition is needed for the ECB lead agency in Indonesia, the field facilitator, and lead agency for a response and an agreed code of conduct when acting jointly is also essential for effectiveness.

To be more effective in a response ECB members need to have pre-agreed standards for shelter and NFI distributions.

ECB members used opportunities to better identify geographical areas in which to work but missed opportunities to act as an NGO lobby group to push for improved coordination across West Sumatra and potentially ensure a more effective response for beneficiaries.

ECB members need to have agreed positions for whether to work as a consortium with donors and if so how and under what circumstances. This clarity will also enable ECB members to be better able to hold donors accountable for the positions they communicate to NGOs.

ECB global and the headquarters of each agency needs to ensure that staff from regional and emergency response teams are fluent in ECB and understand why it is important for each of the participating agencies to cooperate.

9. Conclusions on the consortium's joint actions during the West Sumatra response

During the March 2 evaluation workshop participants were asked to draw conclusions based on all the evidence presented. This evidence was both from the village level discussions, external stakeholders and interviews with staff from across the eight ECB agencies. The conclusions were on four themes: the speed of the response, its effectiveness, its quality⁴⁹ and its impact. The views expressed indicate that members perceived that more deliberate collaboration during the West Sumatra response resulted in some gains in terms of the speed, quality, effectiveness and the impact of the response.

⁴⁹ Please note that the ECB Indonesian consortium does not have agreed definitions for these words. If performance is to be assessed in relationship to them in future it would be helpful to define indicators of success for each word.

The difference the consortium's joint actions made to the *speed* of the response

The results are mixed. Agencies were able to map the affected areas of the earthquake more quickly by working together. However the response time for each of the agencies in regards to logistics, e.g. procurement, delivery of NFIs, was considered to be the same as in other emergency responses. The OFDA funding did not influence the speed of response as each agency received funds from their respective headquarter offices. They did not wait for OFDA funds to arrive. Using their own resources, they began procurement and delivery of goods to targeted villages/households. As a result, beneficiaries received the various NFI packages quickly. However, two agencies were delayed in implementing their T-shelter programs.

Though the speed of the response was not affected by the joint funding arrangements, perceptions varied on whether some agencies within the consortium gained while others lost out. Greater transparency and accountability on funding arrangements would be an advantage if consortium funding happens in future.

OFDA was perceived to be a prime beneficiary of the joint fundraising arrangement as they only had one agency to deal with rather than several. However agencies acknowledged that the funding arrangement resulted in funds being less concentrated than with a few agencies. It also resulted in wider coverage across West Sumatera.

The difference the consortium's joint actions made to the *effectiveness* of the response

The results are mixed. The JNA process brought gains including in optimizing the use of staff resources as only one agency had to assign staff to tabulate the data for three agencies. The JNA process enabled data to be collected across a wider geographic area and for data on various sectors to be obtained in a short period of time. It started discussions on geographic targeting and there was less geographic overlap during the data collection process. The JNA was '*not efficient*'⁵⁰ providing too much information for rapid assessment purposes and too little for in-depth assessment purposes. The JNA results were not used by all agencies. Some agencies conducted both more rapid and in-depth assessments. Other agencies had adequate data from the JNA to begin planning their response. There were a number of meetings to agree on the JNA process and the work to be done under the OFDA grant. These meetings resulted in agencies sharing much information about their programs. The information assisted ECB agencies to target assistance more effectively. Also Oxfam completed a security assessment at the districts and shared it with other ECB agencies. However, the agencies did not have common standards on NFI distribution and T-shelter and the timeliness of the shelter programs varied.

The difference the consortium's joint actions made to the *quality* (e.g. accountability) of the response

The results are mixed. There was restraint on the part of agencies in overlapping of NFI distributions in the same geographic areas particularly in relationship to the geographic areas specified in the OFDA grant. This suggests that a common grant led to improvements in coordinating distributions.

⁵⁰ OCHA's description of using the JNA tool in their October 7, 2010 West Sumatra draft assessment report, p.11.

However field staff also attributed improved coordination to the fact that agencies met a number of times in Padang to discuss geographic targeting. Staff said they knew where other ECB members were working. This made it possible for them to inform local people who asked of the ECB member agency working in their location. However all the ECB agencies worked differently at the local level with some providing clear information to beneficiaries and involving them in decisions and others not doing this well.

ECB agencies cooperated and decided to conduct an independent joint evaluation. However, during the response each agency followed its own M&E system and there was no common M&E system other than reporting to the donor. The amount of time spent in meetings, decision-making and coordination was perceived to be a loss of time.

The *impact* the response by ECB agencies jointly and independently had in West Sumatra

Jointly, the consortium response had a wider geographic coverage because the agencies made the conscious decision to coordinate. Working together, agencies avoided overlap and were able to identify gaps in targeting. An impact at the consortium level was that agencies gained more knowledge of each other than just at the personal level. At the village level the response independently by ECB member agencies resulted in reduced suffering and basic needs being met. T-shelter programs are underway and in some villages people have a safe place to live though there remains much to be done in order for the housing sector to recover across West Sumatera . As in Aceh the support to housing, where it is not sensitively done, is creating social tension.

10. Recommendations by ECB Indonesia member agencies

The recommendations below are those prioritized by the seven ECB member agencies that attended the evaluation workshop on the 2nd of March. These recommendations are endorsed by the lead evaluator who has added one additional recommendation at the end. When reviewing the recommendations it should be noted that six of the directors of the Indonesian ECB consortium agencies had in their independent interviews said that joint response activities during an emergency should be pursued in future as long as *'they raise the quality of the response so that disaster affected people benefit'*. They did not specify what these activities should be only that a business plan or preparedness plan needs to be developed to define potential activities. The recommendations to be implemented by the Indonesian ECB consortium are to:

Develop standard operating procedures for joint response

Before the next large response, decide what activities will be done jointly during a response and how decisions will be made on leading different activities. Prepare clear guidelines and/or a contingency plan on how such joint activities will be done including for fundraising so that funding arrangements are transparent and accountable. Have agencies that want to participate sign an agreement and then prepare accordingly.

Develop an advocacy plan

Decide how ECB can do better advocacy on issues that matter to improved emergency response and early recovery.

Improve the joint need assessment process

Improve the JNA tool so it is useful for rapid assessment and develop guidance on the process including on data collection, data entry, data analysis, the report and its dissemination. Also complete database development deciding with the ECB global focal point responsible for database development whether the database should be developed in Indonesia or continue to be done externally.

Improve beneficiary accountability

Build common standards on accountability and quality, and implement them so that it is possible to influence and advocate for improvement by all response actors.

Define the Indonesian ECB consortium's vision

Define the vision/mission of ECB. It needs to be clear whether this is to build the capacity of member agencies to respond or to improve the effectiveness of emergency response for the benefit of disaster affected people. Develop a strategy and clarify the objectives, make real targets and define who will primarily benefit – members, disaster affected people, the GOI, etc.

A recommendation for the headquarters and regional offices of each ECB member agency is to:

Decide the level of collaboration they expect their country emergency response teams to have with other ECB member agencies and communicate their position widely across their agency

Before the next large response in Indonesia decide whether their country program should be trying to collaborate more effectively with other ECB agencies during an actual emergency response. If such collaboration is expected then communicate this expectation to all global rapid response staff and new country directors before they are appointed so that new staff can support and not hinder collaboration.

Annexes

Annex 1: Terms of reference

FOR EVALUATION OF ECB CONSORTIUM RESPONSES TO THE WEST JAVA EARTHQUAKE 2 SEPTEMBER 2009 AND WEST SUMATERA EARTHQUAKE 30 SEPTEMBER 2009

BACKGROUND

On Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) project:

The Emergency Capacity Building (ECB)⁵¹ Project is a global initiative implemented jointly by six international humanitarian organizations (CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, Save the Children and World Vision International) with the main purpose to improve the speed, quality, and effectiveness of the humanitarian community's emergency preparedness and response by building capacity at the field, global organizational and humanitarian sector levels for staff development, accountability, and disaster risk reduction. The global ECB project management has selected four countries and one region that will be implementing the ECB Phase II field level project activities.

In Indonesia the ECB consortium consists of CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, Save the Children and World Vision International), with CRS as the lead agency. The Indonesia consortium also includes the International Medical Corps (IMC) and a national partner Masyarakat Penanggulangan Bencana Indonesia (MPBI) or the Indonesian Society of Disaster Management. The Indonesian ECB consortium worked together formally from 2005 to 2008. It began a second phase in early 2009. It is the only ECB country consortium to have participated in ECB phase I and phase II.

Joint Emergency Response Activities:

On September 2, 2009 a 7.4 Richter Scale (USGS) earthquake hit some areas in West Java province at 2:55 PM local time, with the epicenter at 30 km depth, 142 km southwest of Tasikmalaya city in West Java province (this city is located about 265 km southeast of Jakarta, or about 5 hours drive from Jakarta). A second 5.1 RS earthquake followed at 15:15 at a depth of 38 km; and a third 5.4 RS earthquake struck at 16:28 at a depth of 15 km. Cities and districts most affected by the earthquake included Tasikmalaya, Garut, Bandung, Cianjur and Sukabumi in West Java; and Cilacap in Central Java.

On September 3, 2009, some of the ECB Indonesia consortium members (CRS, Mercy Corps, Oxfam – GB, World Vision and Save the Children) deployed their respective emergency team members to conduct a joint assessment in the affected areas. Although this joint effort did not materialize into compiled data or a joint response, the consortium members implementing responses in the affected area in West Java did so in consultation with each other in regards to geographical target areas.

⁵¹ More information on ECB can be found on www.ecbproject.org.

On 30 September, 2009, a 7.6 Richter Scale magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of West Sumatra at a depth of 71 km, followed by a second one (6.2 RS) 20 minutes later. A third earthquake of 7.0 Richter Scale hit Jambi and Bengkulu provinces (south of West Sumatra province) in the morning of October 1st. As of the 15th of October 2009 the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB)⁵² confirmed that the earthquakes had killed 1,117 people, 2 people were missing and 2,902 people were injured. Housing was the most severely damaged sector. The GOI's initial estimate was that 200,712 houses were severely or moderately damaged⁵³. This was later reduced to 181,066 houses.⁵⁴ The Sumatra Humanitarian Response Plan was issued by the United Nations in coordination with the GOI on the 9th of October. This estimated that 250,000 families (1,250,000 people) were affected by a total or partial loss of their homes and livelihoods.⁵⁵ This is approximately 25% of the population of the province of West Sumatra.⁵⁶ The estimated cost of earthquake and subsequent landslide damage was US \$2.3 billion.⁵⁷

On 1 October 2009, the ECB Indonesia Consortium members met in Jakarta and agreed to conduct a joint need assessment, led by Mercy Corps with participation from CARE, Save the Children and World Vision teams. Other organizations also collected information using the JNA tool. The results were compiled into a database designed by Mercy Corps and the information was presented to the UNOCHA and humanitarian organizations responding to the emergency in West Sumatera.

While all the agencies pursued funding individually, three grants were made to the consortium as a whole, all of them with Mercy Corps as lead agency for the grant: one from USAID for 300,000 USD and one from OFDA for 3,000,000 USD for coordinated responses, and one from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for 200,000 USD (part of which is being used to fund this assessment).

The purpose of this evaluation is to examine the results of the different types of joint action – ranging from joint assessment only in West Java, through the different processes and structures of the joint actions in West Sumatra – in terms of the objectives of the ECB program, with the objective of recommending improved degrees of and methods for collaboration among ECB partners in future emergencies (specific recommendations for the Indonesia consortium and more general recommendations for future joint actions of ECB consortia).

OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

- 1) Review the ECB Indonesia consortium in emergency responses in West Java and West Sumatera earthquakes, measured in terms of the ECB goal to improve the speed, quality and effectiveness of the humanitarian community to save lives, protect the livelihoods, and defend the rights of people

⁵² UNOCHA Indonesia Earthquake Situation Report #15, 15 October 2009.

⁵³ UNOCHA Indonesia Earthquake Situation Report #17, 23 October 2009

⁵⁴ IASC Indonesia Shelter Cluster, District Level Summary of Shelter Support, 17 February 2010.

⁵⁵ UNOCHA – Earthquake Situation Report # 14, 13 October 2009.

⁵⁶ West Sumatra Earthquake Humanitarian Response Plan in Coordination with the Government of Indonesia, 9th October, p.1.

⁵⁷ BNPB, West Sumatra and Jambi Natural Disasters: Damage and Loss and Preliminary Needs Assessment, 30 October p. xii.

in emergency situations. This review will include both the *process* of collaboration and the *results* of the actual program in West Sumatra.

- 2) Review the levels and degree of coordination of the consortium members as a group with the National, Provincial and District governments and the BNPB, and other key stakeholders including other INGOs, national NGOs, UN agencies and donors.
- 3) Define recommendations for improving the collaboration in emergency response in the future. The recommendations will inform future protocol and guidelines of collaboration and joint response for both the Indonesia consortia and other ECB country level consortia.

SPECIFIC ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

Speed: The evaluation will examine to what extent the joint nature of the response (from initial assessment to delivery of assistance) and funding mechanism affected the speed at which beneficiaries received needed assistance.

- Did the assistance provided achieve the anticipated changes for the affected population in a reasonable amount of time?

Quality: The evaluation will examine the quality of the actual joint assessments and the assistance provided to affected communities

- Joint assessments: Did the agencies produce quality joint assessments, given the coordination, training, execution, and use of assessment data?
- Assistance: Did the responses meet Sphere standards? Did the responses incorporate beneficiary accountability measures, **transparency, participation, design/monitoring/evaluation, feedback, and leadership/governance**⁵⁸? Were the interventions and resources provided relevant to the need, context, and culture of the affected populations? What changes (positive and negative) did the assistance bring about for the beneficiaries?

Effectiveness: The evaluation will examine the effectiveness of the response in light of the agencies working in consortium.

- How did the joint evaluations and responses benefit from previous joint preparedness planning?
- How did the consortium define and follow clear roles and responsibilities in its joint actions?
- How effective was coordination of response operations among the consortium members (including communication and information management) as well as with other governmental and non-governmental stakeholders?
- How did support from ECB beyond the consortium (agency managers, advisor groups, and ECB project staff) support or hinder the consortium joint efforts? What additional support may have been useful?

For the West Java response, these issues will be applied to the joint assessment, and for the West Sumatra response, these issues will be applied from the assessment through program implementation phases.

METHODOLOGY

⁵⁸ See ECB working paper "[Accountability: Key Elements/Core Understanding for ECB Agencies](#)"

The evaluation team leader will propose the methodology for meeting the objectives defined above, in consultation with the evaluation team and the consortium. This will include formulating the evaluation questions that will be answered to meet the evaluation objectives and issues for consideration. Data will come from at least the following sources:

- Review of relevant literature, including that related to ECB project, the grant proposals, minutes of meetings, etc. This includes the ECB publication, [“What We Know About Joint Evaluations of Humanitarian Action Learning from NGO Experiences”](#) and ECB consortia guidance materials.
- Field observation
- Key informants interviews and/or focus group discussions with key stakeholders, including : i) country directors of the ECB consortium agencies; ii) ECB Indonesia Field Facilitator; iii) members of ECB Indonesia Program Management Team; iv) OFDA representatives; v) UNOCHA representatives.

The evaluation team will take all reasonable steps to ensure that the security and dignity of affected populations are not compromised and that disruption to on-going operations is minimized. All documents and data collected from interviews will be treated as confidential and used solely to facilitate analysis. Interviewees will not be quoted in the report without their express permission.

MANAGEMENT OF THE JOINT EVALUATION

The evaluation will be organized by CRS Indonesia that will also serve as the primary point of contact for the evaluation team. CRS will work with MC as the direct grantee of the Gates Foundation that funds and supports this activity, and with Oxfam – GB who will take the lead in following up with the development of ECB Indonesia contingency plan or protocol/guideline for joint emergency response.

Coordination, administration, and funding support: Mercy Corps, as the grantee of the Gates Foundation, will cover the costs of evaluation activities. As the lead agency in this evaluation, CRS will sign a sub – grant contract with Mercy Corps and manage the funds for this event, as well as recruit and hold the contract with the evaluation team leader/consultant. An **evaluation steering committee**, composed of representatives from CRS and 3-4 other Consortium members, will oversee the evaluation, specifically: finalizing the TOR, selection of the evaluation team and leader, inform the methodology, name key informants, review of the draft evaluation report, and develop an evaluation management response.

Technical support: The ECB global Accountability and Impact Measurement (AIM) Advisors will support the evaluation as necessary, such as reviewing the TOR and assisting in the selection of the evaluation team.

Focal Points In – country (steering committee members noted with an *):

Name	Agency	Contact Information
Yenni Suryani*	CRS	ysuryani@id.seapro.crs.org
Malka Older*	Mercy Corps	molder@id2.mercycorps.org

Tess Bayombong*	CARE	Tess_bayombong@careind.or.id
Jimmy Nadapdap	World Vision	Jimmy_Nadapdap@wvi.org
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Antonia Potter*	Oxfam – GB	apotter@oxfam.org.uk
Naomi Wyles	IMC	nwyles@imcworldwide.org
Faisal Djalal	MPBI	Faisal.djalal@gmail.com

TEAM COMPOSITION

This evaluation will be led by an external consultant who will be responsible for the overall evaluation process, including the production of the evaluation report. The remainder of the team (4-5 people in total) will be Indonesian staff from one or more ECB Indonesia consortium agencies and may also include ECB AIM Advisory or Standing Team members and from ECB Focal Points from each ECB member agencies if they have the appropriate qualifications.

Team members will be selected by the steering committee in consultation with the ECB Indonesia consortium on the basis of impartiality and their abilities to fulfill the tasks outlined in this TOR, with suitable balance of appropriate knowledge of ECB and emergency response programming, sector specialties related to the responses, and gender balance.

The evaluation team lead should have the following skills and experience:

- At least five years of managing, implementing and/or evaluating humanitarian programs, with evidence that s/he has evaluated at least three other large scale emergency programs.
- Demonstrated understanding of the nature of working in consortia.
- Demonstrated oral and written communication skills (writing sample needed).
- Demonstrated cross-cultural skills.
- Experience of planning and facilitating interactive review meetings.

Other team members will have as many of the above qualifications as possible, and in addition bring local language skills.

SCHEDULE AND MILESTONES

The proposed calendar of activities is as follows:

- Final TOR approved by the ECB Indonesia Consortium: 15 January 2010
- Recruitment of evaluation team leader: 18-24 January 2010
- Selection of evaluation team leader and team members: 25-29 January 2010
- Evaluation : 15 February-March 5 (tentative) [with anticipated 10 days in the field]
- Draft evaluation report review by steering committee: 8-10 March 2010
- Final report : March 15, 2010

DELIVERABLES

From the evaluation team:

1. Finalized evaluation team scope of work, detailing methodology (including interview protocols, key informant list, etc.), specific schedule, roles and responsibilities of team members, incorporation of relevant [OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards](#) and the checklists in the [ALNAP Quality Proforma](#), etc.
2. Draft and final evaluation report.
3. Feedback from evaluation team on feedback any suggested modifications or additions to the [ECB guidance on joint evaluations](#) based on their experience.

From the steering committee:

1. Management response on how evaluation results will be used for future joint activities.
2. Bahasa Indonesia translation of final evaluation report, distributed to appropriate stakeholders.

In order to maximize the utility of the evaluation, the evaluation team will ensure the following:

Communication of Results: The evaluation team will present the preliminary findings and recommendations to key stakeholders in order to provide immediate feedback to the consortium members and other ECB players, and to afford the evaluation team opportunity to validate findings. The evaluation team will consider the input but produce an independent report, acknowledging steering committee disagreements if necessary and as appropriate.

The final report will consist of an Executive Summary of no more than 5 pages that covers the main findings of the evaluation. The main text should consist of no more than 30 pages, covering methodology, findings and recommendations, with annexes. The primary audience of the evaluation is the ECB Indonesia consortium, and the secondary audience is the ECB Project agencies and other stakeholders involved in the joint actions.

The report will be produced in English, and at the minimum the executive summary will be translated into Bahasa Indonesia to enable National and Local Government, partner agencies and the local community to read and understand the findings. An appropriate budgetary provision will be made for translation.

Following publication of the evaluation results, the ECB global team may share this with other ECB consortiums in other countries and upload this to the ECB sharepoint and/or website. It will be up to the ECB consortium to share it with other agencies and stakeholders in Indonesia.

Use of Results: The results of this joint evaluation are intended not only to increase the quality of the joint response and collaboration, but also to guide similar joint activities in the future. The findings of the evaluation will be placed in the public domain to promote improved evaluation quality throughout the wider humanitarian community. Stakeholders targeted by specific recommendations will be expected to outline plans of action wherever appropriate and agency focal points listed below will be responsible for monitoring follow-up at a country and institutional level as appropriate.

Annex 2: Joint evaluation schedule

15 th Feb	External evaluator Arrives in Jakarta
16 th	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation team meets with the steering committee to focus the evaluation, understand the big questions to be addressed, and review the methods. • Joint evaluation team reviews the evaluation guide, verifies the time commitment of team members and adjusts the proposed evaluation plan according. • Director of one member agency interviewed.
17 th	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One team member begins to compile documents on Sphere standards used by the five member agencies participating in the OFDA grant. • Directors of two different member agencies interviewed. • Emergency response staff of one member agency interviewed.
18 th	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Directors of three member agencies interviewed. • Phone interview with a PMT member. • Interview with the Indonesian ECB Field Facilitator.
19 th	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Director of one member agency with two of their emergency response team interviewed. • Evaluation team members travel to Padang.
20 th	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation team facilitates workshop with consortium member emergency staff in West Sumatera and verifies the villages that will be visited by the evaluation team. • Update by team member compiling agency documents on relief standards.
21 st	Planning by the evaluation team to agree methods and the questions to used during village visits and when interviewing external stakeholders.
22 nd	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field work in one village and interviews with three different types of external agencies. • Evening debrief by team.
23 rd	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field work in two different villages. • Evening debrief by the team.
24 th	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field work in two different villages. • Evening debrief by the evaluation team and data tabulation starts.
25 th	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Director of one member agency interviewed. • Data tabulation completed and data analysis starts.
26 th	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview with District level GOI officials. • Interview with a PMT member from one member agency. • Data analysis by team continues.
27 th	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data analysis completed and team develops preliminary conclusions. • Team travels to Jakarta.
28	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preparation for interagency workshop starts • Interview with a PMT member and an emergency response manager of one agency.
1 st March	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting with USAID/OFDA representatives involved in funding West Sumatera Response. • Team completes preparation for Workshop with consortium members.
2 th	Interagency workshop with seven out of the eight consortium member agencies to review the findings and draw conclusions and recommendations.
3 rd – 6 th	Report writing by the evaluation team.
7 th	External evaluator returns to UK
8 th - 12 th	Steering committee reviews and comments on report and sends comments to Yenni Suryani who sends them to the lead evaluator.
15 th -31 st	Lead evaluator revises report and sends it back to Steering Committee on the 22 nd March. A 2 nd round of comments and report revision occurs leading to a final report on 1 st April.
April	Steering committee translates executive summary for wider circulation and posts final evaluation on ALNAP and ECB websites.

Annex 3: Number of participants at village level

For each agency a visit was made to their office. The team spoke to staff about the overall emergency program and the work in the village. The number of people we met is summarised below.

Agency	Field staff		FGDs		Village Leaders	Random Interviews	
	Agency	Partner	Men	Women		Men	Women
CARE	2	2	16	16	1		4
CRS	5	1	7	8	1	1	1
Mercy Corps	4	1	6	6	1	1	1
Save	1		11	10	1		1
WVI	3		7	13	1	1	1
Totals	15	4	47	53	5	3	8

Annex 4: Joint evaluation participants

Name	Title	Organization	Relationship to ECB
Achmad Judi Wiryawan	Logistic Officer	CRS	
Antonia Potter	Country Director	Oxfam	Indonesia member agency
Charlie Damon	Humanitarian Coordinator	Oxfam Australia	
Cut Desi Amalia	Non – technical Team Leader	Build Change	ECB partner in an OFDA grant
David Hockaday	Global Field Project Manager	ECB	ECB staff member
Endang	West Sumatera DRR Manager	Mercy Corps	
Erwin Muhammad	Deputy	Padang City Development Planning Board (Bappeda)	
Faisal Djalal	Secretary General	Indonesian Society for Disaster Management (MPBI)	Indonesia member agency
Graham Mackay	Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator	Oxfam GB	ECB member at global level
Harlan V. Hale	Principal Regional Advisor, Southern Africa	USAID, OFDA	Head of West Sumatera DART team
Ismet A	Assistant Project Manager	P3SD	CARE project partner
Ita Balanda	Program Officer WSEER	World Vision	
Jeni Bastiaan	Program Officer	IMC	
Jimmy Nadapdap	HEA Director	WVI	PMT member
Jonathan Hodgdon	Country Director	IMC	Indonesia member agency
Juan Christie	M&E officer for the WSERR	Mercy Corps	
Khallid Saifullah	West Sumatra Director	Walhi	CRS and Oxfam partner agency
Lilik Trimaya	ER Coordinator	Oxfam GB	PMT member
Maharani Hardjoko	DRR Manager & Emergency Specialist	Save the Children	PMT member
Malka Older	Director of Programs	Mercy Corps	PMT member
Mark Fritzier	Country Director	Save the Children	Indonesia member agency
Matt Bannerman	Project Director	ECB	ECB staff member
Medi Yusva	Project Manager West Sumatera Program	CARE	
Naomi Wyles	Emergency Program Coordinator	IMC	PMT member
Neil Brighton	Information Manager	West Sumatra Shelter Cluster	
Rahmat Setiawan	Program Manager West Sumatera Program	CARE	
Roy Abimanyu	Project Manager West Sumatera Program	Oxfam GB	
Rae McCrae	West Sumatra Manager	Save the Children	
Sean Granville Ross	Country Director	Mercy Corps	ECB lead agency for the West Sumatera Response
Steve Barton	Coordinator	West Sumatra Shelter Cluster	
Sui Gulam	Shelter Program Officer	Save the Children	
Syahri Ramadhan (Adhong)	CRS Agam Field Office Director	CRS	PMT member
Supriyanto	Program Manager WSERR	Mercy Corps	

Tanty Pranawisanty	Monitoring and evaluation advisor for WSERR	Mercy Corps	
Tess Bayombong	Country Director	CARE	Indonesia member agency
Trihadi Saptoadi	Country Director	WVI	Indonesia member agency
Wahyu Widayanto	Head of Social Mobilization	CRS	
William Schmitt	CRS Agam Team Leader	CRS	
Yacobus Runtuwene	WSEER Response Manager	WVI	
Yenni Suryani	Country Team Leader	CRS	ECB Indonesia lead agency
Yogi Mahendra	Security Coordinator	IMC	
Yusak Opposunggu	Program Specialist	USAID	Part of West Sumatera DART Team
Yohana Pakpahan	M&E Specialist	Save the Children	
Yuen Karnova	Executive Secretary	Padang Pariaman Government	
Zul	Expert Staff for Development	Padang Pariaman Government	

Annex 5: CARE's Emergency Response to the West Sumatera Earthquake

Date of response: October 2, 2009 to December 31, 2010 for immediate relief and January to July 31 2010 for early recovery.

Objective: provide disaster relief to and support the rehabilitation and recovery efforts of 30,000 earthquake affected people in Padang district of Indonesia.	Number reached By March
Output 1: Disaster affected HHs receive immediate emergency relief supplies as of 31 December 2009 Emergency shelter kit: 13,956 HHs Household shelter kit 6,743HHs Communal shelter kits 7,362 HHs Household NFIs 7,887 HHs	69,780
Output 2.1: Affected HHs receive essential emergency WASH support.	
Output 2.2 3,400HHs provided cash grants for T-shelter construction that is safe, adequate and durable (beneficiary selection completed and cash grants to be distributed March 2010).	

Narrative: CARE has worked in Indonesia since 1967. At the time of the earthquake they did not have an office in West Sumatra. The agency sent staff to start their assessment on October 2 and they began NFI distribution by October 7th. They worked in locations badly affected by the earthquake, focusing their work in the district of Padang Pariaman. Their beneficiary selection criteria were families who were severely affected by the earthquake.

Sources for the information in this section: The joint evaluation team spent one day in a village served by CARE in Padang Pariaman. During the drive to the village and after the village visit they were briefed by the agency's partner staff and implementation team about the emergency response program. In addition the evaluation team reviewed the agencies emergency response strategy dated 20th of October. The results below represent the findings from all these sources.

The Village: The road to the village was of tarmac. The road circled way up into the hills far from Pariaman City. People live in semi- scattered houses and the area, while rural, is very densely populated. People are primarily rice farmers owning small plots of land and cultivating some cocoa and coconut.

For the first two weeks after the earthquake both men and women said there was much disorder. Houses and schools had collapsed and the electricity and the cell network was down. They were cut off for the first few days and then relatives arrived to help them. Men began to salvage materials from collapsed houses in the village in which people said 98% of the houses had been badly damaged. Their immediate needs were for food and then tents or tarpaulins so they could sleep out of the rain. One week after the earthquake they needed medicines because people were getting sick because it was raining heavily.

During the first week after the earthquake trucks arrived with food from individuals. The people of Qatar sent water tanks and people in Singapore sent buffalo for the id festival scheduled at the end of the week. Government support for food began to arrive. CARE arrived and started to do an assessment and a week later it began distributing NFIs. *'During the assessment process, CARE staff asked the people*

what were their biggest needs' (the men's group). Many other NGOs came to distribute NFIs. In February 2010 an agency arrived to just start an emergency shelter program. The men claimed that none of these latter NGOs spoke and coordinated with the people before providing assistance. They questioned the usefulness of the emergency shelter support being provided by the agency that arrived in the village in February.

Appropriateness: Men and the leader could describe the activities carried out by CARE in detail. They claimed that everything was useful as it met immediate needs. *'The distribution of NFIs was everyday to everyone until all families had received NFIs'*. All the 7 surrounding sub villages received NFI support. Men appreciated the kits especially the tool kits so they could start to clear areas for their families to sleep. Women appreciated the hygiene and household kits as everything in their houses was destroyed. The women liked that CARE had put all items they distributed into one big box.

Technical standards: Sphere standards were used to define the quality and contents of NFI kits. The agency will use the shelter cluster standard in providing its support for T-shelters.

Accountability to local people: Men said CARE staff gathered them together and asked them about their needs before they started distribution. CARE staff were said to keep the men and the leader updated on all program plans and the schedule for activities. They were clear about the criteria for the shelter program and the number of families that will receive T-shelter support. The men said *'we feel respected by this agency but not by other NGOs'*. On the other hand the women did not know much and asked to be more involved.

Recovery: The level of housing damage across this village is huge and there are many people sleeping in unsafe houses. Men said the irrigation systems were damaged by the earthquake and no action has been taken by anyone to repair the system. According to them the economy is not back to normal.

Immediate impact: Basic needs were met. Receipt of items has allowed people to start to focus on other activities.

Stakeholder Concerns: Women requested that they be as involved in the program as men. Both men and women raised concerns about the non-ECB agency that arrived in the village in February to provide emergency shelter. They claimed that the agency went straight to houses that were severely damaged and only spoke to the individual family about the support they would provide. No one knew the criteria for support of the newly arriving shelter agency. The men thought the agency should have spoken to all of them first and explained the program. This new shelter program they said seemed to duplicate some of the planned efforts of CARE. They prefer working with CARE as they had worked respectfully with them since October, though their shelter support is late. However some of the women have already accepted support from the new shelter agency because their children are sleeping in unsafe conditions. They also want shelter support from CARE as it is of better quality but they have been advised by CARE that families receiving shelter support from other agencies will not qualify for the program. The village leader wondered how useful the emergency shelter support from the non-ECB member would be as it is plastic sheeting on a wooden frame and a tin roof. He wondered if the difference in shelter support would create social tension.

Recommendations for CARE from villager level

Involve women as much as men as *'women know better than the men what their families need'*. (Women's group).

Start transitional shelter programs more quickly so people can then focus on economy activities.
Help the community to repair the mosque which was destroyed by the earthquake.

Recommendations for NGOs in general were that they should coordinate with local people, ask them about their biggest needs and inform disaster affected people of what they will do.

Annex 6: Catholic Relief Services Emergency Response to the West Sumatera Earthquake

Date of response: October 2, 2009 to May 31, 2010.

Objective: Earthquake affected households in target villages of West Sumatera province live in safe, adequate, and durable shelters that provide the basis for disaster recovery.	Number of people reached
Output 1: 8770 HHs received emergency shelter and other NFIs in a timely manner.	43,500
Output 2.1: 10,000 HHs received construction cash grants as of March 31, 2010 and are building transitional shelters that are SAD.	50,000
Output 2.2 Above HHs and skilled labors receive practical knowledge of Safe-Adequate-Durable construction.	
Output 3: 10,000HHs have rebuilt permanent homes that are earthquake resistant.	

Narrative: CRS has worked in Indonesia since 1957. When the earthquake occurred they did not have an office in Padang but did have local partners in West Sumatera. CRS sent staff to start their assessment on October 2nd and they began NFI distribution by October 6th. They worked in locations badly affected by the earthquake and where few agencies had reached. They focused their work in Agam and Pasarman Barat Districts. Their beneficiary selection criteria were earthquake affected families who are not currently living in Sphere compliant shelter including HHs still living under tarpaulins and in transitional shelters of inadequate space, comfort or quality.

Sources for the information in this section: The joint evaluation team spent one day in a village served by CRS in Agam District. Prior to visiting the village they were briefed by the CRS implementation team about the emergency response program and the difference they thought the program made to people. In addition a recently completed evaluation of their OFDA program and the results of their beneficiary satisfaction survey were reviewed. The results below represent the findings from all these sources.

The Village: The road to the village was often mud track disappearing into a river at various times. People live in scattered houses. They are primarily rice farmers owning small plots of land. They supplement their income by being day labors on other people's land for which they earn around \$3 a day. The sub-village leader considered the people economically poor.

When the earthquake struck the men were still in the fields. The women and children were at home and ran out of the houses. 80% of the houses collapsed. Houses, being built of brick, could not withstand the earthquake. Only two houses remained standing in the village. Everyone we spoke with said housing was the most pressing need. The one good clean water source in the village was broken but they repaired it soon after. Mice filled the fields eating at the stalks. This event was said to be abnormal by both men and women and resulted in a poorer harvest.

For the first two weeks after the earthquake both men and women said they were just too sad to do anything. Men did begin to salvage materials from collapsed houses. Three days after the earthquake they began receiving tarpaulins, tents and food. Food was delivery by helicopter three times and given to the village leader for distribution. The GOI also gave money for food. Used clothes came from individuals. NFIs came from two different ECB agencies and money for housing and temporary shelter from CRS. Relatives came and helped them to rebuild their houses. They knew CRS was providing

support with T-Shelter because their staff came often. *'CRS had given them money which they really needed to rebuild their houses'*.

Appropriateness: They all appreciated the cash provided by CRS for constructing a T-shelter and the system by which the cash was distributed. The men appreciated that the money could be used flexibly for the purchase of any type of construction materials or for labor. Women appreciated the fairness of the cash distribution. The leader appreciated the distribution of NFIs in the village as people are poor and people all put them to immediate use.

Technical standards: The transitional shelter supported by CRS follows a safe, appropriate and durability standard that is Sphere compliant. No one we met mentioned the technical training provided by the agency. The agency staff thought it was because women came to the socialization sessions on housing construction but the men do the building.

Accountability to local people: The villager leader said that all agencies came and explained what they were doing before taking action. This he appreciated as he could keep all village people informed. Participants in the focus group knew that CRS was monitoring the cash distribution program with their local leaders but they did not describe the monitoring process and the criteria for shelter support. The program was considered fair by the local people we met in the way it was implemented.

Recovery: Men and women said that things are back to normal in the village economically. Many houses are still being repaired and they are awaiting the GOI funds to complete their houses.

Immediate impact: The tarpaulins provided by CRS were good for making quick shelters. Once they were received people used them as a place to sleep. As cash grants were provided and transitional shelters built people had safe places to stay and they could get back to working in the fields. For women having such a T-shelter meant their children were comfortable. Receiving cash for construction purposes enabled families to make decisions themselves on what to fix and the materials they would use. They mentioned that STC had run play centers for their children. This had helped the children recover from the trauma of the earthquake. They knew nothing more about STC.

Stakeholder Concerns: Women requested more cash as the amount received was not enough to make the house into a permanent one. One woman wanted to build a brick house. When asked what would happen in the next earthquake with brick houses she wondered if she'd keep the half brick half wood house that she has now. This raised questions among the evaluation team of the effectiveness of the socialization process on earthquake resistance houses.

Recommendations to the ECB member agency from villager level

The leader asked that T-shelters be provided for some isolated families that were missed.

Annex 7: Mercy Corps Emergency Response to the West Sumatera Earthquake

Date of response: October 1 to 30 December 2009 for the emergency program and January to April 2010 for the early recovery program.

Objective: Support the immediate survival needs of families displaced by the earthquake.	Numbers reached
Output1: Hygiene and toolkits provided to 10,400 HHs	52,000
Output 2: Voucher support for reconstruction materials provided to 3,500HHs	
Output 3: Rain water collection support provide to 2,700HHs	

Narrative: Mercy Corps has worked in Indonesia since 1999. At the time of the Earthquake they had an office in Padang and they were implementing a DRR program in West Sumatra in partnership with a local NGO named Kogami. In some villages, disaster preparedness committees were established and evacuation routes and places to go identified in the event of a tsunami warning.

Sources for the information in this section: The JE team spent one day in two sub villages in the district of Padang Pariaman where Mercy Corps had worked after the earthquake. Prior to visiting the village the JE team was briefed about the agency's emergency response by Mercy Corps West Sumatra implementing team. In addition the JE team used the recently completed OFDA report to verify achievements and heard about the evaluation and beneficiary satisfaction survey activities that are taking place in March. The results below represent the findings from all these sources.

The Sub-Villages: The two sub-villages visited are located near Pariaman City. The village they are a part of has 19 sub-villages. Housing in sub-villages is nucleated with people living close together. People in one sub-village were mostly dependent on rice farming for their livelihoods and people in the other sub-village were dependent on fishing.

Earthquake damage in both sub-villages was high with 95 out of 100 houses damaged in one sub-village and 284 houses damaged out of 310 in the other. After the earthquake villagers evacuated to higher land areas that were clear of buildings. The preparedness plan they had developed with the support of Mercy Corps and the local NGO Kogami⁵⁹ was used effectively to organize people and get them to safety. By the next morning everyone returned to their sub-villages. There they continue to try and fix their houses. Immediate needs following the earthquake in the farming community were for latrines and temporary shelter. Needs in the fishing community were for food, latrines and clothes because of the heavy rains.

The second day after the earthquake an agency arrived to distribute food and rice. By October 4th Mercy Corps began distributing hygiene and toolkits. During October, many other agencies came to these sub-

⁵⁹ At the time of the Earthquake the ECB agency had been working with Kogami (Komunitas Siaga Tsunami), a local NGO for almost a year and with the people in these sub-villages for five months.

villages. The men's focus group named 8 agencies that responded in the fishing village. Men said there were too many NGOs and they were not coordinating with each other or with local people but duplicating. *'They felt like NGOs did not respect them'*.

Appropriateness: People could describe the activities carried out by Mercy Corps. Women greatly appreciated the hygiene kits and the men the toolkits. Both appreciated the temporary communal latrines provided after the earthquake. The team visited some of the latrines. All of them were clean and well maintained. Also appreciated by everyone we spoke to were the preparedness activities that had taken place prior to the emergency. Some appreciated the vouchers with a 700,000rupiah value provided for construction though this raised concerns which are described below.

Technical standards: The agency applied Sphere standards for their NFI distribution and in their work on immediate hygiene and water and sanitation activities. Build Change provided technical support to local homeowners in the sub-villages that had received vouchers, providing them advice on the purchase of quality construction materials including on the quality of nails and wood.

Accountability to local people during the emergency: Prior to the emergency Mercy Corps had kept people informed of plans and worked well with them. During the emergency response period the agency worked with local leaders. Mercy Corps responded fast and provided all households across the 19 sub-villages hygiene kits. Communal latrines were equitably spread across the 19 sub-villages.

Issues of equity were raised by three different types of informants we met in the sub villages. The concern arose over the distribution of vouchers and water tanks. Seven sub-villages received vouchers and the other 12 sub-villages had not. Water tanks were provided to local leaders for distribution of one for three families. Villagers reported that water tanks were provided to the first person who walked through a leader's door. Informants were not clear of the criteria used for voucher and water tank distribution. Particularly because of voucher distribution the leader for the larger village said that this was not considered *'fair'* and believes voucher distribution to only some sub-villages and not to others has created social envy.

Recovery: Economic recovery was said to be slow as families continue to rebuilt their houses and focus less on other work. Those in the fishing community said that they are still focusing on fixing their houses and have not spent much time on fishing. Women from the farming community said that besides the voucher from Mercy Corps they have never received tents or T-shelter support and still really needed them particularly as their houses are not safe for their children and earthquakes keep happening. Only Mercy Corps had provided a voucher for housing repair or reconstruction. While much appreciated the voucher was said to be too small in value to buy an adequate amount of construction materials to create a safe transitional shelter. In addition to housing destruction, many shops were destroyed in the larger sub-village and they are only slowly being repaired.

Immediate impact of this ECB agency's support: The preparedness training helped villagers to know how to organize so they could evacuate people quickly from the sub-villages. *'People in both villages are well prepared for disasters'* (men's group). The vouchers and toolkits have helped households repair

their houses faster though much remains to be done. Hygiene education which was conducted along with the provision of communal temporary latrines was reported to be resulting in behaviour change e.g. people were washing their hands more frequently and keeping their children cleaner (men and women).

Stakeholder Concerns: People are not clear of the criteria for voucher and water tank distribution. The voucher size is not adequate to repair badly damaged houses. Local people cannot distinguish between the work of the local NGO and Mercy Corps. Local people come to ask the local NGO about all the work being done by Mercy Corps and the LINGO is not sure what to say. The evacuation route is too small and was crowded when used after the earthquake. A new route is needed.

Recommendations for Mercy Corps from village level

If another earthquake occurs ensure that all assistance is equitably distributed so that it is considered fair and there is no 'social envy'.

If there are many villages needing assistance, do the assessment with the sub village leaders, define criteria with them and then select beneficiaries based on the criteria.

Ensure all recipients are clear about criteria for the different forms of assistance provided.

Involve local people more in setting criteria and doing the distribution.

Continue to provide hygiene and disaster preparedness training.

Increase the number of evacuation routes so evacuations go well if a disaster strikes.

Ensure that the temporary latrines are made permanent.

The advice of the men's group to NGOs in general is to respect them, coordinate with local people and with each other.

Annex 8: Save The Children's Emergency Response to the West Sumatera Earthquake

Date of response: October 2, 2009 to March 31, 2010.

Overall goal: to reach 150,000 people, including up to 90,000 children with a holistic humanitarian assistance package, including shelter, educational support, health and nutrition strengthening and child protection initiatives.	150,000
Shelter: to restore dignity and privacy, reduce health risks and protect disaster affected populations	630HHs
Child Protection, education and primary health care support: 1. To support children in their recovery from the earthquake.	50,000

Narrative: STC has worked in Indonesia for over 30 years. When the earthquake occurred they did not have an office in Padang. They immediately mobilized staff and resources and used pre-positioned supplies to start NFI distribution as of the 4th of October. STC worked in locations badly affected by the earthquake in Agam and Padang Pariaman district. They used the government's guidance on beneficiary selection and focused their work on the most severely affected families.

Sources for the information in this section: The JE team spent one day in a village served by STC in Padang Pariaman. Prior to visiting the village they were briefed by the STC implementation team about the NFI and T-shelter programs. In addition the West Sumatra Earthquake Revised 6 Months Response strategy was reviewed and a beneficiary satisfaction survey completed by the agency in January 2010. The results below represent the findings from all these sources.

The Village: The village could be accessed by car. It is rural and isolated. 80% houses looked heavily and moderately damaged. There are still many damaged houses not yet salvaged. People are primarily rice farmers owning small plots of land. They also cultivate coconut, betel nuts and cacao. Some residents supplement their income by being day labors on other people's land and others have small business such as food stalls or small shops. The sub-village leader considered the people economical poor and after the earthquake said the conditions of people had become even worse.

When the earthquake struck people were still in the fields. The women and children were at home and ran out of the houses. 80% of the houses collapsed. During the FGD, most participants mentioned that housing '*a safe place to sleep*' was their most important need and then food, tools and resources to salvage building materials and money. The irrigation system was also destroyed and this has resulted in a poor harvest. The head of the sub-village said that though the harvest was poor the economy was getting better compared just after the earthquake when everything seemed paralyzed.

One week after the earthquake men began to salvage building materials. Two weeks after the earthquake, 12 October household kits were received from STC. The government also gave cash for food, Rp 5,000 per person (maximum people covered was 5 persons / family) for 30 days. There were also individuals who provided support to villagers in terms of food, cash, clothing and or building materials. Many relatives came and helped them to rebuild their houses. Most people in the village did

not know STC and found it difficult to pronounce the name of the agency but they remembered well the NFI items (HH and tool kits) distributed. STC has just started distributing the cash grant for transitional shelter.

Appropriateness: Everyone in the village appreciated the NFI provided by STC as it was distributed equally to all of the earthquake survivors in the village. People did not need to think about their basic needs for a month as STC provided household, hygiene and tool kits. However during the FGDs there were many questions about the beneficiary selection criteria for the T-shelter program being implemented by STC. This is described below.

Technical standards: STC used the Sphere Standard in defining the quality and content of their kits. This standard has inserted into their Emergency Standard for Indonesia in 2005 and suppliers in Indonesia are used that can meet their quality requirements for supplies. The technical standard for T-shelter is that recommended by the shelter cluster but it was not evident that local people knew much about the T-shelter standard that was to be met.

Accountability to local people: The sub-village leader said all agencies or individuals came and explained what they were doing before taking action. He also mentioned that STC had provided a complaints box in the posko but that people did not use it. STC had completed a beneficiary satisfaction survey indicating that people were satisfied with NFI items. However people in this village did not know STC and they were not clear about the qualifying criteria or details of the T-shelter program. There was disquiet in the village over the program which is just starting as few HHs are expected to receive support.

Recovery: Men and women said that they were still struggling to rebuild their homes. Economically they said things were not yet back to normal. People were working in the fields.

Immediate impact: The shelter and household kits were immediately used by the people. Plastic sheeting was used directly for temporary shelter and household kits met their basic needs so enabling them to focus on other activities.

In another ECB agency village visited by the JE team, people had mentioned that STC had run a play center or child friendly space for their children. This center had helped their children recover from the trauma of the Earthquake.

Stakeholder Concerns: Men and women ask for more information on beneficiary criteria and selection. The sub-village leader asked if more T-shelter support could be provided to more households. The leader was having difficulty preventing conflict and jealousy within the community because of the small coverage and large community needs. People asked to be better informed of the details of the project. People in this village were also concerned about the lateness of the government cash disbursement for shelter repair. Shelter and a safer house is now their biggest need.

Recommendations to the STC from village level

The leader asked for greater coverage in T-shelter support and greater transparency transparent about the beneficiary selection process so that social envy can be avoided.

Annex 9: World Vision Indonesia's Emergency Response to the West Sumatera Earthquake

Date of response: October 2, 2009 to September 30, 2010.

Project goal: To meet the basic human needs of people affected by the earthquake and ease the suffering of the affected communities.	14,350 HH
1. Families have access to emergency shelter, clothing, bedding and essential household items to restore their daily routines.	
2. Families and children have access to sufficient quantity and quality of water in accordance with Sphere Minimum Standards and good hygiene practices are promoted.	
3. Children have access to safe and appropriate learning environment and their rights are protected	
4. Families have access to basic health services and their health risk is reduced.	

Narrative: WVI has worked in Indonesia for many years. The agency did not have a presence in West Sumatra but 12 hours after the earthquake it sent in an initial assessment team and staff from Jakarta and nearby regions. Within 24 hours of the response, the agency had distributed 4,000 pre-positioned collapsible water containers to 2,000 households in 2 targeted villages to be used as safe water carrying containers. WVI worked in areas badly affected by the earthquake in the districts of Kota Padang, Agam and Padang Pariaman. Their beneficiary selection criteria were families that were the most severely affected by the earthquake.

Sources for the information in this section: The JE team spent one day in a village served by WVI in the district of Padang Pariaman. Prior to visiting the village they were briefed by the agency's Program Officer and the implementing team about all the programs being implemented for the response including the WASH, Health and Child Protection programs. In addition the agencies 30 and 60 day strategies for West Sumatra and a recent evaluation report were reviewed. The results below represent the findings from all these sources.

The Village: The village was easily accessible by car. It is a rural village and a poor area. 65% houses were heavily damaged and 35% houses were moderately damaged. There were still many damaged houses not yet salvaged. People in the village are primarily rice farmers owning small plots of land. They also produce coconut and cacao. They supplement their income by being day laborers on other people's land. Some have a food stall or small shop to generate income. The sub-village leader considered the people economical poor and after the earthquake said conditions were dire but that it was getting better now.

When the earthquake struck people were still in the fields. The women and children were at home and ran out of the houses. After two weeks, the village leader mentioned that the village did not receive anything from other agencies because the houses along the road did not look heavily damaged.

'Agencies just passed by the village'. Then he wrote a proposal and gave it to NGOs. After two weeks WVI and other NGOs came to distribute food and NFIs. During the FGD, most participants mentioned

that food and housing '*a safe place to sleep*' were the most needed items and then medical support, water, tools and resources to salvage building materials including money. The village irrigation system was also destroyed and this resulted in a poor harvest. The head of the sub-village mentioned that though the harvest was poor the economy was beginning to recover.

One week after the earthquake, men started to salvage building materials. Two weeks after the earthquake agencies started to distribute food and non-food items. All the distributions were managed by the sub-village or posko to avoid jealousy and ensure that everybody received the support. The government also gave cash for food, Rp 5,000 per person (maximum of 5 persons / family) for 30 days. Also some individuals provided food, cash, clothing and building materials. Many relatives came and helped them to fix their houses. Most people in this village did not know WVI but they remembered well the NFI items (HH and tool kits) distributed.

Appropriateness: People confirmed receipt of NFI kits. They said the kits met their priority needs. The quality of the NFIs were appreciated and the distribution through the posko ensured that all items were distributed equally to all people in the village. Receipt of NFIs meant people could think about other issues such as economic activities.

Technical standards: WVI used the Sphere standard for defining the quality and content of their NFI kits. They ensured that the tools distributed were familiar to the local people and they would be safe to use. People are expected to be able to use the tools to repair and reconstruct part or all of their shelters. The WVI distributed tools were in line with the list agreed in the Shelter Cluster.

Accountability to local people: The sub-village leader said all agencies or individuals came and explained what they were doing before taking action. He had all the notes about each agency working in the village and the type of assistances they provided. The sub-village leader knew that WVI was implementing a school based project in that village and recruited local labor from the community for its project. In mid January, WVI assigned one staff member the responsibility for collecting community feedback. Otherwise people in this village did not know WVI.

Recovery: At present there are not many houses repaired as along the way the JE team could still see many people living in unsafe houses. Some temporary shelters were being used. Men and women said that they were still struggling to rebuild their lives. Economically they were not back to normal yet. As the community lives in a rural area, they said it was difficult for them to prosper economically as they had to depend on local resources.

Immediate impact: Participants and the sub-village leader said that the assistance provided by WVI helped people and families to recover faster and helped to ensure that people's basic needs were met. The shelter and household kits were immediately used by the people. Plastic sheeting was used directly for temporary shelter. The sub-village leader said that the school based project (latrines) and the hiring of local people as labors was helping to stimulate the local economy.

Stakeholder Concerns: There was no major concern from stakeholders. During the first two months of the program the Christian nature of the agency was an issue. The sub-village leader handled questions

about WVI and the issue went away. As people in the village did not know much about WVI they did not have feedback for them.

Recommendations to WVI from village level

The leader asked WVI to involve people more or more actively introduce the program so that people know the agency better.

Annex 10: The Stories

The stories described below capture the main events that occurred on three specific collaboration themes. These events were described to evaluation team members in Jakarta and in Padang by staff from country director to field level following the earthquake. The details were reviewed and amended by participants during the evaluation workshop on the 2nd of March. The phrasing of each particular point was not agreed to by everyone though in general these points had the approval of most of the group.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (leadership, role and responsibilities)

- The consortium met on 1 October in Jakarta. This was at the office of Mercy Corps. They were the only ECB member agency with a presence in West Sumatra. Mercy Corps had worked in West Sumatra since 2002 and had an established relationship with GOI officials in various parts of the province. It was on this basis that they asserted leadership of the consortia's response in West Sumatra. Leadership was not negotiated. Participants at the October 1st meeting included Country Directors and the ECB consortium Field Facilitator.
- As the West Sumatra lead agency, Mercy Corps offered logistical support in Padang to all ECB member agencies.
- Some said that CRS, the ECB lead agency, called them to coordinate after earthquake to find out what they would do. Agencies said they were confused on who was taking the lead. Leadership was interpreted differently.
- A USAID proposal was submitted by Mercy Corps as the West Sumatra lead agency for the ECB consortium. This was submitted on 3-4 October and it was not seen by the other agencies; they offered sub-grants to the other ECB agencies.
- Two agencies accepted the sub-grants from USAID, 1 agency accepted for a local partner.
- The West Sumatra lead agency invited the Field Facilitator to work from their office to better coordinate communications about the joint actions. The move didn't happen.
- After the meeting on 1 October, the Field Facilitator was absent from the whole communication process on joint funding.
- OFDA approached the West Sumatra lead agency and said they liked the consortium idea, and asked Mercy Corps as the lead in West Sumatra to prepare a proposal on behalf of the consortium. There were meetings in Jakarta between 5 members that would participate in the OFDA proposal.
- OFDA denied verbally asking a specific agency to lead.
- STC had submitted its proposal to OFDA before ECB had prepared one. They said members of their emergency team were informed about an OFDA funding opportunity by the OFDA regional advisor as they were both on the same flight from Bangkok to Jakarta.
- At some earlier point, CRS said it had clearly informed OFDA they were the ECB lead agency in Indonesia.
- Communications between some of the members on the OFDA grant process became confused.
- The discussion about having a "business process agreement" was mentioned at the meeting after the OFDA grant funds were allocated to help avoid such confusion and to facilitate decision-making in future.

- In Padang some agencies had global rapid response team members join their West Sumatra emergency response teams. They were not aware of ECB. This complicated relationships and communications, especially where only verbal agreements between agencies were in place. The newly arrived international team members contributed to miscommunication, lack of understanding, tension and a lack of coordination.
- In Padang, ECB coordination meetings took place twice in October to discuss/agree geographic targeting and the OFDA proposal (though decisions on fund allocations were with country directors in Jakarta).
- Some sitreps were issued on West Sumatra lead agency letterhead.
- As of November, the West Sumatra lead agency clearly defined the boundaries for its leadership. This was in relationship to the OFDA grant and nothing else on ECB. They encouraged the Field Facilitator to come to Padang to lead ECB coordination meetings.
- The Field Facilitator conducted weekly meetings from early November to mid-December. All agencies were invited through their Country Director and PMT member. Minutes were issued.
- Otherwise agencies were working independently in West Sumatra in their geographic areas and though discussions to limit overlapping took place it still occurred to some degree by two agencies and a lot by one agency. This overlapping drew formal complaints but it continued nonetheless (source two PMT members).
- Two agencies with the agreement of other members worked on the development of an Accountability capacity building development plan for all agencies. This is funded by a Gates Foundations grant to the ECB.
- Also from the same Gates grant to ECB, member agencies at a meeting in Jakarta in January agreed that a Joint Evaluation should take place in February. In February CRS provided two staff for the joint evaluation team each for nearly two weeks, CARE provided a staff member for nearly two weeks and WVI provided a staff member for a few days.
- Implementing staff were collaborating bilaterally on the Good Enough Guide training and sharing of technical information/materials particularly on shelter. Such bilateral collaboration continues until today.

JOINT NEEDS ASSESSMENT (JNA)

- In consideration of their existing presence in the area the West Sumatra lead agency said it would coordinate all aspects of the JNA, e.g. agreements on geographic areas where each agency would do data collection, tabulation.
- 5 ECB members decided to carry out a JNA using the same assessment tool. Member 6 recommended participation by one of their local partners.
- OCHA took an active role in promoting the JNA tool.
- Geographic locations for data collection were agreed using District and Sub-district lines. Some members agreed to pair 1 staff with staff member from another agency. There is no evidence this happened. Data was to be sent daily. This was difficult as some locations were remote and electricity was often down.

- There was some rapid training in the JNA tool but staff still had difficulties in its use. One reason was because there is no agreed methodology or guidelines for data collection.
- Each agency collected data in specific geographic areas though some overlapping occurred on data collection in the same areas.
- The West Sumatra lead agency M&E staff created Excel sheets, compiled the data, and worked overtime at a time when there was no electricity in Padang. They reported struggles to get data from agencies. 2 members were very easy to coordinate with and sent their data. Three agencies never sent data.
- The tool was not very data-entry friendly making the work extra hard.
- Only the West Sumatra lead agency *and* the ECB logo were on the JNA datasheet when the data was presented in the Padang OCHA coordination meeting. One agency did not submit data because it was angry about the logos.
- The JNA result was presented at OCHA meeting in Padang.
- The West Sumatra lead agency sent the data to Jakarta where it was presented by the West Sumatra lead agency on behalf of ECB at an OCHA meeting. Only the submitting agency and ECB's logos were on the submission to OCHA on the 8th of October.
- The West Sumatra lead agency used the assessment results to design their response program as did some other ECB agencies. Two didn't use the results but did more assessment work as the JNA report was late. All agencies did more in-depth assessments on their own.
- Terminologies in the JNA still need to be reviewed and clearly defined (since agencies worked with volunteers to do the assessment). Questions need to be classified as to the timing of their use, e.g. 24/48/72 hours, and types of disasters in which to use the JNA tool.

FUNDRAISING AND USE OF RESOURCES

- The West Sumatra lead agency called all agencies on Friday, 2 October at 3 PM to report USAID had called and requested a proposal by 5 PM. The West Sumatra lead agency submitted a proposal on behalf of ECB for \$300K as they believed in the ECB joint response.
Reactions were mixed:
 - Oxfam recommended their partner to receive funds – they were okay with the submission
 - Some members were not pleased about not seeing the proposal first.
 - Two agreed to participate.
 - Others declined as they had funds from other resources and the amount of the grant was relatively small.
 - IMC was asked by OFDA to submit a separate proposal exclusively for health activities and so didn't participate in this joint funding activity.
- The absence of the ECB Field Facilitator started from the beginning in fundraising discussions.
- The West Sumatra lead agency agreed it would have been good to speak to agencies first but noted the deadline was tight.
- For the 1st proposal to USAID: the West Sumatra lead agency and the ECB logo were on the proposal. The logos of other agencies were not.

- For the 2nd proposal to OFDA: All discussions were in Jakarta between Country Directors though some directors kept field staff in the loop about fund allocation and the views of field staff were taken into account when negotiating.
- The DART team arrived in Padang October 5 and invited agencies to submit concept notes – some members did submit and others started preparing submissions. The DART team came back four times after the initial assessment over a two-month period.
- The West Sumatra lead agency called the 5 ECB agency members to report that OFDA had asked them to lead on a new ECB submission for \$2.5m (additional \$500K came soon after). The proposal needed to be submitted by Friday. Oxfam refused funds because it came from the US government.
- DART said that the decision to submit as a consortium was left to the agencies.
- It was not clear to all what OFDA was saying to each agency, e.g. encouraging a consortium as OFDA told ECB agencies that their independent submissions now needed to be a part of the joint proposal.
- Heated debates⁶⁰ on the split of funds ensued with most arguing for equal shares.
- STC insisted on the amount in their original concept note stating that OFDA had verbally approved the amount.
- An additional \$500K was later provided by OFDA. This was distributed “offline” – through phone discussions. There was no meeting to agree on the allocation of the \$500K, agencies were just informed.
- OFDA specifically requested that sub-grants not be equally divided but allocated according to capacity on the ground.
- Regional directors heard of debates on fund divisions. Norms for joint funding were not in place. Some unpleasant telephone exchanges between some Country Directors + Regional Directors took place on funding.
- Some Country Directors were more insistent / assertive on the OFDA allocation of funds for their agency. Others decided to compromise so they could get back to focusing on the response. STC received 43% of fund with the balance of funds going to others.
- As the agency with the largest amount of funds STC agreed to provide shelter and NFI materials to other agencies as they had an established pipeline. The provision of NFIs was offered to make fund allocation more equitable – 3 agencies accepted the offer of procurement support, one declined. The 3 agencies did not receive any NFIs / shelter materials as goods were distributed by the agency as materials arrived in Padang. Communications between the agencies (Country Directors) involved were heated. The fact that other agencies never received NFI materials was said to be caused by miscommunication between the Jakarta Country Directors and their staff in Padang on how this was to take place.
- Debates on overhead costs also took place.
- Members were independently submitting proposals to Gates.

⁶⁰ During the 2nd of March evaluation workshop participants were given the stories of what happened to amend as necessary. The majority of comments made during the workshop were then incorporated into the three stories. However there was no consensus on the use of the word ‘heated’ to describe discussions on funding allocation. A few said that ‘heated’ seems a strong word. Another person said that ‘*heated*’ is the correct word, even though what happened was worse’.

- The West Sumatra lead agency submission to Gates was a success and \$200K was included in their grant for unstipulated ECB activities.
- The West Sumatra lead agency called to notify all ECB agencies of the grant and invited them to decide how to use the funds. Members agreed to the allocation of Gates funds for 3 capacity building activities with different agencies taking the lead on each.
- By January an OFDA report was due on \$3M grant. The West Sumatra lead agency compiled this with input from each agency. It had been managing donors' relationships.

Annex 11: Other recommendations

There were many recommendations made by key informants. During the 2nd March evaluation workshop participants were asked to select the three most important recommendations. Recommendations that received three and more votes during the evaluation workshop are described in the narrative of this report. Recommendations that received less than three votes are captured below in order of the number of votes received. Please note most of the recommendations listed below received only one vote.

Joint response

- Ensure that information on the agreements made within ECB by Country Directors is clearly communicated to emergency response managers in the field.
- Become a consortium that brings together agencies' strengths to respond together for immediate relief and that goes it alone for longer term recovery and development.
- Ensure that any joint actions that are to be undertaken will actually add value during a large response, e.g. focus on what can be done well.
- Better integrate resources, service delivery and learning.
- Standardize response kits.
- Explore how ECB can be represented at cluster meetings when all agencies are responding to the same emergency.
- Define the role of the field facilitator during a large response.

Geographic targeting

- Ensure better geographic targeting.
- Clarify norms for delivery of assistance to disaster affected areas which do not focus on territoriality.

Beneficiary accountability

- Ensure a stronger role for communities during the relief phase of the emergency.

ECB consortium

- Conduct further discussions on the merits of joint funding and on the parameters of how it would work in practice, e.g. how do resources get allocated in an efficient manner.
- Interlink CEP activities better and make the CEP more strategic in defining the value ECB can add in Indonesia looking at whether joint advocacy is more strategic than joint response in an emergency.
- Before trying to respond, develop a joint contingency plan that includes joint advocacy and include a more comprehensive map of capacity including on skills in assessment, resources, key staff, local partners, geographic spread and GOI relationships so members are better informed of what will happen on the ground and know how to complement one another based on agency strengths.
- Participate in non-emergency response activities regularly so relationships are built and clarity maintained on purpose of ECB so that some of the issues experienced this time are avoided.
- Ensure the visibility and identity of each member is maintained.
- Don't overcomplicate the process both during a response and for the work that ECB does together outside of a response.

For individual members

- Within each member agency, communicate at all levels on ECB – Directors, PMTs and with emergency field staff – clarifying at each level what is to be done jointly.

Partners and Government

- Use the capacity building platform to improve the capacity of LNGOs and the GOI to respond so that the quality of the response overall improves since the quality of member responses is dependent on the capacity of all actors to effectively respond.
- Share information on local partners.
- Ensure joint capacity building activities continue to invite other agencies including GOI and they benefit from ECB (don't become exclusive) and that ECB's efforts adds value to the efforts of these other actors.

Joint Evaluation and Learning

- Learn from the joint evaluation what should be pursued jointly and what could have been done better in West Sumatra.
- Document the learning from this and the earlier work by ECB including that in Phase I.

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⁶¹ Most of the documents noted in the references were provided by various ECB member agencies in Indonesia including OCHA and IASC Shelter cluster documents. They were not downloaded from websites.

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